Climate policy has become one of the principle casualties of America’s political polarisation. The Trump administration, for instance, recently announced it is dismantling a key ocean monitoring system, despite growing scientific concerns about the rise of a “Super El Niño” and the prospect of disruption to key Atlantic Ocean currents. This move is consistent with Project 2025, the conservative policy blueprint that explicitly calls for dismantling major elements of US climate science capacity.
As a British climate scientist and former chair of UCL’s Climate Action Unit, I am concerned that the UK should avoid following the same path.
For more than a decade, political scientists have documented the rise of what is known as affective polarisation: the tendency for supporters of different political parties not merely to disagree, but to view one another with deep and uncompromising animosity.
In a landmark 2015 study, researchers at Stanford and Princeton universities found that partisan identity in the US had become a powerful source of social polarisation, shaping attitudes and behaviour in ways that rivalled or exceeded many traditional social divisions.
The UK can still avoid that trap. Not because British politics is immune to division – it clearly is not – but because Britain’s distinctive institutional architecture, combined with resilient public support for climate action, provides a foundation for a different political outcome.
A different starting point
One reason for cautious optimism is that UK climate policy has historically enjoyed a degree of cross-party support. The Climate Change Act of 2008 passed with overwhelming backing from all major parties. Margaret Thatcher was among the first world leaders to warn publicly about the risks of global warming. Theresa May’s Conservative government embedded the net-zero target in law.
More importantly, Britain has built institutions designed to insulate climate policy and research from short-term political turbulence. The Climate Change Act, the official advisory status of the Climate Change Committee, legally binding carbon budgets, and the Higher Education and Research Act 2017 together form a framework that can survive changes of government. The latter constrains ministerial intervention in the selection of research grants under the principle that researchers should decide for themselves which projects are funded.
Unlike in the US, where climate policy and its execution has depended heavily on executive action, the UK’s approach relies on durable institutions and long-term planning – a form of democratic immune system against short-term political shocks.
Signs of strain
Yet that consensus is showing cracks. Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch has pledged to repeal the Climate Change Act. Reform UK has made opposition to net-zero a central part of its political platform, with deputy leader Richard Tice calling renewable energy a “massive con”.
Such attacks are real and consequential, but the crucial question is whether they reflect a genuine shift in public opinion.
The evidence suggests they do not.
Polling analysed by the Institute for Public Policy Research and YouGov shows that belief in the reality of climate change, and support for achieving net-zero emissions by 2050, remains remarkably resilient. Around six in ten voters continue to support the target. Support is highest among Green party voters, at 86%, with 76-79% of Labour and Lib Dem voters also in favour. Almost half of Tories likewise back the target (48%), although this lower level of support is also more lukewarm.
What needs to happen
If Britain is to avoid the climate polarisation that has captured American politics, three priorities stand out.
First, actively defending the institutions that have sustained long-term climate policy. The Climate Change Committee, the carbon budgets, and the legislation are all susceptible to attack by future governments. Securing them as essential democratic infrastructure – like an independent judiciary or a professional civil service – rather than as party-political tools is the first line of defence.
Second, building cross-party spaces where moderate voices can cooperate. The newly launched Council for the Future, chaired by former Conservative environment secretary Lord Deben, is a model. It provides a “neutral non-partisan space” to discuss climate policy away from the culture war.
Third, designing climate policy to include tangible household benefits. The government’s £15 billion warm homes plan – offering zero-interest loans for solar panels, batteries, heat pumps and social housing upgrades – is exactly the right model.
A choice, not a fate
Public support for climate action remains strong. The economic opportunities associated with the transition are increasingly clear. And the institutional foundations for long-term policymaking remain intact.
The question is not whether Britain must agree on every aspect of climate policy. Democracies rarely do. The question is whether climate change becomes another front in an ever-widening culture war, or whether sufficient political consensus can be preserved to address a critical long-term national and international challenge.
The American example vividly illustrates the cost of failure. The UK still has the institutions, the public support and the political space to avoid that fate.
Chris Rapley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.