{"id":987,"date":"2026-07-06T14:24:16","date_gmt":"2026-07-06T14:24:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/2026\/07\/06\/nato-summit-will-reveal-how-alliance-plans-to-manage-european-security-as-us-cuts-back-its-support\/"},"modified":"2026-07-06T14:24:16","modified_gmt":"2026-07-06T14:24:16","slug":"nato-summit-will-reveal-how-alliance-plans-to-manage-european-security-as-us-cuts-back-its-support","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/2026\/07\/06\/nato-summit-will-reveal-how-alliance-plans-to-manage-european-security-as-us-cuts-back-its-support\/","title":{"rendered":"Nato summit will reveal how alliance plans to manage European security as US cuts back its support"},"content":{"rendered":"

Two massive Russian attacks on Kyiv<\/a> in less than a week, renewed Iranian threats<\/a> in the Strait of Hormuz, and a security crackdown in Turkey<\/a> are just three of the immediate issues shaping the context of the Nato summit<\/a> in Ankara on July 7-8. <\/p>\n

While Ukraine and Iran will be on Nato<\/a>\u2019s agenda, the authoritarian drift of its host, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan, will be politely overlooked. But as ever, the summit outcome will be determined by the position of the United States. <\/p>\n

At last year\u2019s Hague summit, the Nato-sceptical US president, Donald Trump, was placated by the allies\u2019 commitment<\/a> to spend 5% of their GDP annually on defence by 2035. The challenge this year will be to demonstrate sufficient progress towards that goal, while also addressing Trump\u2019s vision of \u201cNato 3.0\u201d \u2013 involving, according to<\/a> his secretary of war, Pete Hegseth, \u201ca balanced alliance with Europe in the lead for its own defence\u201d.<\/p>\n

Progress towards defence spending appears reasonably on track. In 2025 alone, the Atlantic Council notes<\/a>: \u201cEuropean allies and Canada increased defence spending by 20% from the previous calendar year.\u201d Six Nato allies (the three Baltic states plus Denmark, Poland and Norway)
\nspent more on defence as a share of GDP than the US. Germany, not among that group in 2025, nonetheless has big ambitions. In absolute terms, it is now Nato\u2019s second biggest defence spender<\/a>. <\/p>\n

The allies have also made strenuous efforts to wean themselves off American-sourced defence systems. But bumps in the road remain. Whereas in 2025, all the Nato allies (bar Iceland, which has no armed forces) met Nato\u2019s 2024 standard of spending 2% of GDP on defence, this will not be repeated in 2026. The Czech government and Hungary are likely to dip below<\/a> the target. And many spending commitments still need to translate into concrete capabilities. Europe\u2019s defence industries are working flat out, but are at the limits<\/a> of how fast they can absorb new investment. <\/p>\n

The success of the summit may just be down to luck and the volatile mood of the US president. Trump seems unable to accept that the Nato allies have made genuine progress in defence. He claimed just days before departing for Ankara it was \u201cridiculous\u201d<\/a> that the US continues to support a \u201cone-sided\u201d Nato. That grievance appears to be one reason the meeting may withdraw<\/a> its endorsement of Albania \u2013 a low-spending Nato member \u2013 as the 2027 summit venue. <\/p>\n

Things could also prove tricky on another of Trump\u2019s pet complaints<\/a> \u2013 the lack of Nato support for the US-Israeli war with Iran. The Nato secretary general, Mark Rutte (who chairs the summit), seems determined to avoid getting too deeply into discussion of the situation.<\/p>\n

But if it does intrude, safety will likely be found in the formulation recently agreed by the G7<\/a> \u2013 welcoming the US-Iran deal, condemning Iran\u2019s nuclear ambitions and supporting a Franco-British led maritime operation in the Strait of Hormuz. Don\u2019t expect a Nato coordinating role in any operation, however. On that, there is no allied consensus.<\/p>\n

United approach on Ukraine war<\/h2>\n

There will be greater scope at the summit for dealing with Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine and the broader threat to European security that emanates from the Kremlin. The Trump administration has grown increasingly distrusting of Putin and, in parallel, more impressed with the Ukrainian war effort. <\/p>\n

This has translated into some positives for Ukraine: the country\u2019s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, will be<\/a> at the summit, attending<\/a> the Nato-Ukraine Council and the Ukraine Defence Contact (Ramstein) Group meetings, which coordinate western support for Ukraine. <\/p>\n

He will be hoping for more concrete commitments similar to British<\/a> and German<\/a> defence packages for Ukraine. Nato\u2019s Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (Purl)<\/a> initiative, launched last summer, has also already been a big success in keeping arms and other military aid flowing to Ukraine. <\/p>\n

That initiative will be reaffirmed at Ankara, signalling a clear commitment to Ukraine-Europe defence links. But the allies still lack a consensus on offering Nato membership to Ukraine. The US is adamantly against it. So a pathway to accession will not be spelled out at the summit.<\/p>\n

Where\u2019s China?<\/h2>\n

Other items missing from the agenda at Ankara will also reflect the Trump administration\u2019s priorities. It\u2019s no surprise that climate change and Women Peace and Security<\/a> \u2013 a UN-led initiative which recognises and fosters women\u2019s contribution to peacekeeping \u2013 have fallen out of favour. Both issues figured in Nato communiques during the Biden period \u2013 both disappeared from last year\u2019s Hague summit declaration. Don\u2019t expect a mention at Ankara. <\/p>\n

More curious, though, is the lowered priority given to China. Nato\u2019s 2019 London declaration contained Nato\u2019s first ever summit-level statement on China, recognising that the nation\u2019s growing influence brought challenges as well as opportunities \u2013 a move engineered<\/a> by the first Trump administration. Then, Nato\u2019s relevance to the US was judged by how it was positioned in the emerging era of \u201cstrategic competition\u201d.<\/p>\n

Under Biden a similar logic applied, reinforced by the 2024 Washington summit\u2019s description<\/a> of China as the \u201cdecisive enabler of Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine\u201d. And yet China disappeared from the 2025 Hague declaration. It was not discussed at Nato\u2019s recent foreign and defence ministerials. Neither is it expected to<\/a> figure at Ankara. <\/p>\n

Why not? The Trump administration\u2019s recent efforts at accommodation<\/a> with China are part of the answer. Other allies too are happy to see China sidelined from Nato\u2019s business. France, easily perturbed by a globalist Nato, had always been a sceptic when it comes to including China in Nato\u2019s agenda<\/a>. Many east European allies, meanwhile, see a China focus as distracting Nato from Russia. And big exporters like Germany need to keep Beijing sweet, given the shrinkage of their Russian market. <\/p>\n

The summit declaration will again be short to avoid controversy. But like an iceberg, much lies below the surface. The detailed work of moving to \u201cNato 3.0\u201d was already agreed at the Nato defence ministerial<\/a> in mid June. Most of the gaps in Nato\u2019s European defence plans occasioned by<\/a> recent US force announcements have already been plugged. <\/p>\n

The summit will give rise to much noise, but Nato\u2019s ongoing adaptation to the new reality engendered by shifting US priorities suggests a high degree of underlying resilience.<\/p>\n

\"The<\/p>\n

Mark Webber is Senior Non-resident Fellow at the Nato Defence College in Rome and a trustee of Nato Watch. He has previously received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the British Academy to carry out research on Nato.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the Nato Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Two massive Russian attacks on Kyiv in less than a week, renewed Iranian threats in the Strait of Hormuz, and a security crackdown in Turkey are just three of the immediate issues shaping the context of the Nato summit in Ankara on July 7-8. While Ukraine and Iran will be on Nato\u2019s agenda, the authoritarian […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-987","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/987","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=987"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/987\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=987"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=987"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=987"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}