In the 1990s, overwrought geopolitical analysis portrayed the region as dangerous and in desperate need of western salvation. This was particularly true of the US. In 1997, Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor to Jimmy Carter and an \u00e9minence grise of the US foreign policy establishment, dubbed central Asia \u201cthe Eurasian Balkans\u201d on what he called the \u201cgrand chessboard\u201d<\/a> of great-power competition. <\/p>\n At the intersection of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan sits the Ferghana Valley. With its complex patchwork of borders, enclaves and ethnic minorities, it became the focal point of this discourse of danger<\/a>. A 1999 policy report<\/a> written by American academics warned that, without US help, the valley could become \u201ca breeding ground of terrorism\u201d and \u201ca hotbed of religious and political extremism\u201d.<\/p>\n Like most parts of the world, Uzbekistan has had its problems. Rapid economic growth has led to serious urban pollution, and youth unemployment is high, thanks to the growing population. Like other countries in the region, a lack of political pluralism<\/a> limits its ability to effectively grapple with these problems. <\/p>\n But the dire scenarios predicted by western analysts have not come to pass. For my research on borders, nation-building and geopolitics in the Ferghana Valley, I interviewed policymakers across the region. They all stressed the region\u2019s ability to draw on historic cultural ties and practices of statecraft to manage the difficult transition from Soviet republics to independent nations. <\/p>\n After Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan gained their independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the Ferghana Valley states inherited a set of complicated and disputed borders originally drawn as internal Soviet boundaries in the 1920s. These have proved contentious \u2013 yet in recent years the three countries have made a series of deals to transfer territory and fully delimit their boundaries. <\/p>\n The Khujand Declaration<\/a> of March 2025 defined the boundary between the three valley states and put an end to decades of tension. In terms of international experience, this counts as remarkably quick progress.<\/p>\n It is in the Ferghana Valley itself where progress is most visible. I saw border tensions ratchet up in the late 1990s and early 2000s<\/a>. But in the past decade, a new generation of leaders has not only resolved territorial disputes but pushed a significant growth in cross-border economic, social and cultural connections<\/a>. They have reopened dozens of previously closed border crossings, relaxed red tape and incentivised cross-border trade. This has led to significant increases <\/a> in regional trade and has eased ethnic tensions.<\/p>\n In October 2025, the first Ferghana Valley Peace Forum<\/a> brought governments and civil society together under a new platform for dialogue. A key organiser of the event, Akramjon Ne\u2019matov, the first deputy director of the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies<\/a>, an influential state-affiliated thinktank in Tashkent, emphasised that \u201cthe forum\u2019s goal is to strengthen trust and good-neighbourly relations, promoting a shared vision of the region as a space of cooperation and mutual benefit\u201d.<\/p>\n According to Ne\u2019matov, it serves as a robust response to the vision presented in Brzezinski\u2019s \u201cgrand chessboard\u201d. This outdated narrative was not only flawed but risked becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. It sowed mistrust rather than fostering development.<\/p>\n Despite initiatives like the ill-fated Central Asian Union<\/a>, central Asia has not succeeded in creating formal EU-style regional institutions. Western academics have routinely dismissed such attempts as mere \u201cvirtual regionalism\u201d<\/a>. But research<\/a> from St Andrews University<\/a> shows that informal arrangements between authoritarian governments to respect each other\u2019s sovereignty and not allow single external powers to dominate have led to the emergence of an effective, informal regional order premised on personal diplomacy, stability and coexistence.<\/p>\n This digs deep into historical notions of shared destiny. As a politician in Tashkent put it to me: \u201cThe important thing to keep in mind is that we are one home in central Asia, one culture.\u201d As the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and the wars in Armenia and Azerbaijan and Russia and Ukraine wars suggest, central Asia has arguably been more successful<\/a> at resolving post-cold war ethnic and border disputes than Europe. <\/p>\n In March this year, I joined a sell-out crowd at an Uzbek Super League match, cheering on<\/a> Ferghana Neftchi as they beat Tashkent Lokomotiv 3-1. The game took place in an impressive modern stadium in Ferghana. This confounded the predictions of 1990s analysts who saw the Ferghana Valley as the supposed locus of all the region\u2019s ills. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n![\"Map](\"https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/744484\/original\/file-20260626-71-wogjw4.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip\")
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\n Bennian\/Shutterstock<\/a><\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\nResolving border tensions<\/h2>\n
Shared destiny<\/h2>\n
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