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\n My research<\/a> focuses on continuity and change in political insults, and I try to understand if modern politics is more divided and uncivil than it was in the past. I am particularly interested in how politicians use Aristotle\u2019s key modes of persuasion<\/a>: ethos (appeals based on the character of the speaker); pathos (appeals to emotion); and logos (appeals to logic).<\/p>\n The \u201cBrexit effect\u201d on the rhetoric<\/a> of British politics is one of the most damaging legacies of the referendum. It has seemingly resulted in a rhetorical culture in which ethos and pathos are of far more value, and so far more prevalent, than logos. This affects you whether you\u2019re a Leaver or Remainer.<\/p>\n Uncivil rhetoric was often highlighted throughout the Brexit debate. This was the case both during the referendum campaign and then the battles in parliament between 2016 and 2019 over delivering the result. Journalists at the time even questioned why the discourse felt so toxic<\/a>. Often, the debate was framed as \u201cthe elite\u201d versus \u201cthe people\u201d, where the two sides represented irreconcilable identities.<\/p>\n The Leave victory<\/a> was widely attributed to that side telling the more emotionally resonant story<\/a> and, in the process, owning the narrative of who the elite really were. Populism is a contested term, but research has found<\/a> a common feature of this kind of politics is creating a divide between \u201celites\u201d and \u201cthe people\u201d.<\/p>\n In this rhetoric, the elite \u2013 however they are defined \u2013 are always greedy, corrupt, incompetent or just plain evil. On the other hand, \u201cthe people\u201d are virtuous, but exploited by the elite. Politics then becomes a contest between these opposing sides where for one to gain the other must lose. And, in this environment, successful politicians are those who can frame themselves as being on the side of the people rather than the elite.<\/p>\n The 2020 book Brexitland<\/a> argued that leaving the EU represented the first time a major political decision was based not on rational economic self-interest but on feelings of identity. The authors explain that the referendum did not create the divides between those identifying as Leavers and those as Remainers. But, once exposed, those divides could not be unseen. <\/p>\n The decisive issue in politics no longer appears to be \u201cthe economy, stupid\u201d, but rather \u201cif you\u2019re not one of the people, you are the elite, stupid\u201d.<\/p>\n The unpopularity of outgoing prime minister Keir Starmer<\/a> and his government might be seen as a product of this kind of politics. Much has been said about the Starmer government\u2019s inability to tell its own story<\/a>, to define its ethos and connect emotionally with the nation<\/a>. The \u201cloveless landslide\u201d<\/a> that Starmer\u2019s Labour party won in 2024 is not just a result of the \u201cpolitics of nothing\u201d<\/a> that it has been accused of, although this surely has not helped. <\/p>\n The 2024 result was a symptom of Labour\u2019s inability to reconcile (perhaps irreconcilable) identity groups, born of a misunderstanding of politics after Brexit. Dislike of Starmer and his government appears to have killed the notion that sober technocratic deliverism<\/a> is the route to political success.<\/p>\n
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\n Read more:
\n Ten years after the referendum, how Brexit could have been done differently<\/a>
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\nThe people versus the powerful<\/h2>\n
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