The status of the Strait of Hormuz, arguably the only positive takeaway for the US from the MoU, also remains uncertain<\/a>.<\/p>\n So as it stands, the agreement<\/a> is better understood as enabling a pause in hostilities than an actual settlement. It largely restores pre-war conditions while leaving tensions between the US, Iran and Israel unresolved. <\/p>\n Israel remains the elephant in the room. It is deeply affected by the deal but is not a party to it. And it\u2019s still capable of undermining any diplomatic progress with its continuing assault on Lebanon in contravention of the MoU.<\/p>\n The most likely outcome is a return to grey-zone conflict<\/a>, meaning hostile measures that stop short of outright shooting warfare. In this case, proxy warfare, cyber operations, economic coercion and periodic military escalation. The shooting may have stopped \u2013 but the forces that ignited the conflict remain.<\/p>\n None of which looks good for Washington. Trump entered the confrontation promising to dismantle Iran\u2019s nuclear programme, curb its regional influence and restore American deterrence. Instead, the MoU grants Tehran economic relief while leaving unresolved key issues \u2013 missile capabilities, proxy networks and long-term limits on uranium enrichment. <\/p>\n For Iran, survival itself is a strategic victory. Despite sustained US and Israeli pressure, the regime remains intact and negotiating rather than capitulating.<\/p>\n The conflict also exposed the limits of regional security arrangements. Gulf states felt and witnessed<\/a> how even America and Israel\u2019s overwhelming military superiority and expensive advanced weapons systems do not necessarily translate into decisive political outcomes. Nor do they guarantee protection from escalation.<\/p>\n For the US, the agreement appears to reflect the mounting costs of escalation: US$132 billion (\u00a3100 billion) and counting<\/a>. Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz raised energy prices, strained alliances and exposed the limits of military coercion. While sanctions relief and restored oil flows may ease immediate pressures, they also risk reinforcing the perception that sustained pressure and proxy warfare can force even a superpower to negotiate.<\/p>\n Perceptions matter in international politics. For America\u2019s gulf partners, the MoU may raise doubts about Washington\u2019s willingness to sustain ambitious objectives when the economic and political costs become too high.<\/p>\n Iran, meanwhile, appears to have been strategically strengthened by the conflict. Israel faces perhaps the most difficult strategic recalibration. For decades its security policy has rested on military superiority backed by close US support to the tune of some US$4 billion a year. The MoU shows how its strategic priorities are now at loggerheads<\/a> with those of its main ally and sponsor. It raises questions about how far Washington is willing to align its regional priorities with those of Jerusalem.<\/p>\n
\nThe MoU creates space for economic recovery and strategic adaptation, making it likely that Iran will continue pursuing influence through cyber operations, proxy networks and other forms of grey-zone competition. <\/p>\n
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