The SNP won a convincing victory, reflected both in its 58 seats and by being streets ahead of its rivals. But the lack of the sought-after majority, alongside the decline in the SNP\u2019s vote share<\/a> \u2013 down 9.5 points and 13.2 points in the constituency and party list votes respectively, has weakened SNP claims to having won a \u201cmandate\u201d for an independence referendum. <\/p>\n On the other hand, the Scottish Greens\u2019 success in almost doubling its parliamentary representation means that there is a larger pro-independence majority in the Scottish parliament than ever before.<\/p>\n Mandates are always contested. Even if the SNP had secured an overall majority, especially with a similar share of the vote (possible, given that a small shift in just eight marginal constituencies could have delivered a majority), it is unlikely that the UK government would have responded as former prime minister David Cameron did in the wake of the SNP\u2019s 2011 election victory.<\/p>\n Back then, the SNP\u2019s single-party majority sent shock waves through the Westminster establishment. It also far surpassed support for independence, supported then by around a third of the electorate. The then-prime minister\u2019s concession on a referendum mandate posed less of an existential threat to the union than would appear today. Although independence was not a priority issue in the 2026 election campaign, around half of the electorate have consistently said they would vote \u201cyes\u201d in a referendum.<\/p>\n Moreover, the UK Labour government can also claim that it has a mandate from the 2024 election to oppose an independence referendum, having clearly set out its opposition in the manifesto<\/a>.<\/p>\n While the political mandate for an independence referendum is contested, the legal authority is not. There is no route to Scottish independence, or to a referendum on independence, that does not go through the Westminster parliament. <\/p>\n The UK Supreme Court\u2019s 2022 judgement<\/a> made clear that a law to hold an independence referendum would be beyond devolved competence because it would relate to both the status of the union between Scotland and England, and whether Scotland should cease to be subject to the sovereignty of the UK parliament. Both of these matters are reserved to Westminster under the Scotland Act (1998)<\/a>. <\/p>\n The Scotland Act allows for transfers of competence, via Section 30 orders or amendments to the schedule 5 reservations. Following the 2011 election, extensive intergovernmental negotiation led to the Edinburgh Agreement<\/a>. This paved the way for a temporary transfer of competence via a Section 30 order to allow the Scottish Parliament to legislate to hold an independence referendum, and is the route the SNP hopes would lead to a new referendum. <\/p>\n The SNP\u2019s election victory, by itself, is unlikely to be persuasive enough to generate a new agreement. An \u201cunofficial\u201d referendum or a unilateral declaration of independence would not be a meaningful path to independence and is not remotely considered an option by this SNP government.<\/p>\n There may, however, be more pressure on the UK government and the opposition parties in Scotland to clarify what a process might look like in the future and what would trigger it. The further we get from the 2014 independence referendum, the harder it may be politically to rest on the fact that Scots already took a decision on their constitutional future. <\/p>\n The UK constitution, unlike some of its European counterparts, does not prohibit independence for one or more of its constituent parts. Nor does it expressly provide a process to facilitate it, except \u2013 with some ambiguity \u2013 in the case of Northern Ireland.<\/p>\n
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