Kopyrkin\u2019s return came a day after the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, warned Armenia that<\/a> it was leaving itself exposed to what he called the \u201cUkrainian scenario\u201d by deepening its cooperation with western institutions.<\/p>\n This diplomatic rift has been accompanied by economic pressure. Russia has imposed a series of restrictions<\/a> on Armenian exports since late May, citing sanitary and technical concerns, while simultaneously threatening to suspend<\/a> its gas deal with Armenia.<\/p>\n The leaders of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, who make up the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), have also recently demanded that<\/a> Armenia hold a referendum to choose between them or the EU.<\/p>\n A few years ago, this rift would have been difficult to foresee. Russia has widely been regarded as Armenia\u2019s principal strategic partner and security guarantor for decades. Armenia joined the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2002 and the EAEU later in 2015. It also hosts a Russian military base near the north-western city of Gyumri, and depends heavily on Russia for energy supplies and trade.<\/p>\n Their partnership began to erode<\/a> in 2024. That year, Armenia froze its participation in the CSTO, accusing the bloc of failing to intervene during Azerbaijan\u2019s 2023 offensive against the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. The two countries had previously fought a war over the region in 2020, which ended with a Russian-brokered ceasefire.<\/p>\n The Armenian government, which is led by Nikol Pashinyan, subsequently pursued closer political and security ties with the EU and US. It expanded defence cooperation<\/a> with France and publicly questioned the value of Armenia\u2019s traditional dependence on Russia. Armenia also recognised the jurisdiction<\/a> of the International Criminal Court in 2024, despite the court having issued<\/a> an arrest warrant for Putin. <\/p>\n These moves culminated in the adoption<\/a> of the EU Integration Act in March 2025, paving the way for the Armenian government to begin the process of gaining EU membership. Months later, in December, the EU and Armenia formally adopted a framework<\/a> designed to deepen political, economic and security cooperation. <\/p>\n Armenia\u2019s westward engagement has become increasingly visible throughout 2026. More than 30 European leaders, including European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen and European Council president Ant\u00f3nio Costa, gathered in the Armenian capital of Yerevan in early May for a summit of the European Political Community<\/a>. <\/p>\n US secretary of state Marco Rubio visited Armenia later in the month and signed a strategic partnership agreement<\/a> with Armenia\u2019s foreign minister, Ararat Mirzoyan.<\/p>\n Russia is not only losing a longstanding ally in Armenia. It is also losing one of its main levers of influence in the South Caucasus: its key role as a mediator in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.<\/p>\n Already in late 2023, Azerbaijan and Armenia initiated a process<\/a> to agree on and formally define their shared border. And over the past year, the two countries have held direct bilateral talks<\/a> in Abu Dhabi and signed a declaration<\/a> on peace at the White House. They have also begun<\/a> trade and economic cooperation. <\/p>\n These efforts have influenced public attitudes in Armenia. The proportion of Armenians reporting national security and border issues as the top problem facing their country dropped from 44%<\/a> in June 2025 to 21% in February 2026. Russia\u2019s regional influence will only decline further as Armenia and Azerbaijan move towards longstanding peace.<\/p>\n This broader geopolitical realignment forms the backdrop to Armenia\u2019s upcoming elections. Pashinyan\u2019s Civil Contract party promotes a pragmatic \u201cpost-Karabakh\u201d course. This involves acknowledging current realities, pursuing normalisation with Azerbaijan and its close ally Turkey, and gradually deepening ties with western partners. <\/p>\n The two main opposition forces \u2013 the Strong Armenia Alliance and the Armenia Alliance \u2013 advocate closer strategic coordination with Moscow. They blame the current leadership for the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and promise to halt the peace process with Azerbaijan and Turkey if they come to power. <\/p>\n The Strong Armenia Alliance was founded in 2025 by billionaire Russian citizen Samvel Karapetyan. The Armenia Alliance, on the other hand, is led by Robert Kocharyan, who served as Armenia\u2019s president from 1998 to 2008. Kocharyan was also a board member of the Russian investment giant, Sistema. He stepped down<\/a> in 2021.<\/p>\n The European Parliament has raised concerns<\/a> about Russian interference in the election. Russia has been accused of conducting a massive pre-election campaign<\/a> to undermine Pashinyan. This has allegedly involved the spread of online disinformation and a plan to transport tens of thousands of Armenians living in Russia home to vote for the opposition.<\/p>\n As Armenians head to the polls, they will be deciding more than the composition of their next government. They will be choosing between competing visions of the country\u2019s future. In many ways, they will be determining whether the post-Soviet era of Armenia\u2019s close dependence on Russia is coming to an end.<\/p>\n![\"A](\"https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/739811\/original\/file-20260603-69-di9pbc.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.0&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip\")
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\n Nemanja Cosovic \/ Shutterstock<\/a><\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\nArmenia\u2019s choice<\/h2>\n
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