Xi and Putin may be close, but their promises of further cooperation hardly mean the friendship between them has \u201cno limits\u201d<\/a>.<\/p>\n Opposition to US global primacy has formed the foundation of Sino-Russian cooperation since the end of the cold war. In a 1997 statement<\/a>, the two nations condemned the \u201cforcing of the international community to accept a uni-polar world pattern\u201d. While not explicitly naming the US, they also added that no single country should monopolise international affairs.<\/p>\n Xi and Putin reiterated this message in Beijing. They adopted a statement in which they vowed to build<\/a> a multipolar world order and a \u201cnew type\u201d of international relations. However, putting this rhetoric into practice has consistently proved a complex undertaking.<\/p>\n Moscow and Beijing often choose the easiest and least expensive way of opposing the US. They have focused primarily on blocking US-backed initiatives and geopolitical strategies by vetoing UN Security Council resolutions. <\/p>\n But they have stopped short of launching any major joint effort to challenge US power. This was illustrated by the muted response of both countries to the ousting of Venezuelan leader Nicol\u00e1s Maduro in January, as well as their limited support for Iran in its war with the US and Israel. <\/p>\n One reason for this is the asymmetry in their capacity to help each other. Russia lacks the capacity to support China in the economic and technological domains, which are central to the Sino-American rivalry. <\/p>\n In terms of overcoming the US tariffs imposed on Chinese goods, Moscow can offer Beijing neither an alternative or much relief. The Russian market is not rich or attractive enough for Chinese companies, even before the possible fallout from secondary sanctions<\/a> is considered. <\/p>\n Russia is also limited in its ability to help Beijing bypass US export controls designed to restrict China\u2019s access to advanced technologies, from semiconductor manufacturing equipment to artificial intelligence hardware. <\/p>\n Western sanctions and recurrent failures to modernise the Russian economy have caused Russia to fall behind in the global technology race. And since 2022, Russia has been forced to rely<\/a> on China for a number of technologies, from cars and laptops to 5G mobile networks.<\/p>\n China is in a different position. It has political, financial and economic means to support the Kremlin in its confrontation with the west. However, keen to preserve its own global interests, Beijing is highly selective in the support it provides to Moscow. <\/p>\n Chinese state propaganda mirrors Russian talking points and repeats Russia\u2019s justification for its war in Ukraine, blaming the west and its \u201cexpansion\u201d into former Soviet territories. China has also provided Russia with dual-use components<\/a> like chips and fibre-optic cables without which the Kremlin could not sustain its war effort.<\/p>\n But, at the same time, China has refrained from providing lethal weapons to Russia. And Chinese armed forces that conduct regular exercises with their Russian counterparts and carry out joint air and naval patrols around Japan and South Korea, do not participate in similar activities in Europe. <\/p>\n China has also consistently delayed its final commitment to the proposed Power of Siberia-2<\/a> gas pipeline. The planned pipeline would transport additional natural gas from Siberia to China, partially compensating Russia\u2019s loss of revenue from the European market. <\/p>\n Clearly, it is Beijing that dictates the pace of and areas for cooperation between the two countries. And Russia\u2019s leadership seems ready to accept this \u201cjunior partner\u201d<\/a> status. <\/p>\n The Kremlin has sought to reconcile conflicting interests between Russia and China in recent years, particularly in central Asia, rather than challenge Beijing. For example, Moscow has remained silent on the presence of Chinese troops in Tajikistan<\/a>, which was part of Russia\u2019s former sphere of influence. <\/p>\n It helps that China treads carefully and puts substantial effort into creating the illusion of equality between itself and Russia. Despite the negative impact of Russia\u2019s aggressive policy towards Ukraine on Chinese plans to work with Ukraine as part of the China-Europe railway transport corridor<\/a>, for instance, Beijing has refrained from criticising Moscow\u2019s conduct.<\/p>\nThe deepening asymmetry<\/h2>\n
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