{"id":477,"date":"2026-05-18T13:56:52","date_gmt":"2026-05-18T13:56:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/2026\/05\/18\/trumps-cordial-beijing-trip-has-not-changed-superpower-rivalry\/"},"modified":"2026-05-18T13:56:52","modified_gmt":"2026-05-18T13:56:52","slug":"trumps-cordial-beijing-trip-has-not-changed-superpower-rivalry","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/2026\/05\/18\/trumps-cordial-beijing-trip-has-not-changed-superpower-rivalry\/","title":{"rendered":"Trump\u2019s \u2018cordial\u2019 Beijing trip has not changed superpower rivalry"},"content":{"rendered":"

Donald Trump\u2019s appraisal of his recent state visit to China was, typically, positive and self-regarding. At the end of the trip, the US president told reporters<\/a> that it had achieved \u201ca lot of good\u201d and \u201cfantastic trade deals\u201d<\/a> had been signed. He concluded that a lot of different problems were settled \u201cthat other people wouldn\u2019t have been able to solve\u201d.<\/p>\n

As usual, the US president<\/a> appeared to enjoy the pageantry of a state visit. He likes meeting other \u201cgreat\u201d leaders \u2013 strongmen who lead powerful countries. <\/p>\n

At face value, the trip appeared largely successful. The Trump-Xi relationship appeared cordial. There were no undiplomatic comments by Trump. Xi described it as \u201ca milestone visit\u201d of \u201chistoric\u201d proportions. Trump said<\/a> that his relationship with Xi is \u201ca very strong one\u201d. China pledged<\/a> to buy 200 Boeing aircraft and also committed to buying billions of dollars of soybeans and other agricultural goods<\/a>. These are all things Trump can present as wins, even if their significance is disputed<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The cordiality of the visit<\/a> was a contrast to the Biden years, when \u201cextreme competition\u201d<\/a> with China \u2013 in Biden\u2019s words \u2013 was the central organising principle of US foreign policy. The Biden administration viewed<\/a> China as a once-in-a-generation challenger to US power: politically, economically, militarily and ideologically. It believed Beijing was aggressively trying to displace the US as the world\u2019s dominant power and actively sought to prevent this. <\/p>\n

Over the past year, the second Trump administration has shifted attention away from great power conflict with China and focused on other things. These have included regime change in Venezuela (and, all the signs suggest, Cuba is now in his sights). He has changed America\u2019s relationship with Europe, introduced an at-times erratic regime of tariffs in an attempt to address US trade deficits. And, above all, he has started a war with Iran. <\/p>\n

Ely Ratner, a China hawk from the Biden administration has accused<\/a> Trump of \u201cstrategic deference\u201d towards Beijing. And there can be little doubt that the Trump administration has dialled down the Cold War-style ideological rhetoric about China. <\/p>\n

Its 2025 national security strategy stresses<\/a> that: \u201cWe seek good relations and peaceful commercial relations with the nations of the world without imposing on them democratic or other social change that differs widely from their traditions or histories.\u201d This much was evident from Trump\u2019s visit. Unlike Biden<\/a>, Trump did not publicly raises human rights issues on his trip to China. This removed a persistent irritant in the relationship.<\/p>\n

That said, the US Congress \u2013 and many of those around the president \u2013 still see the relationship with China as fundamentally competitive and adversarial. They want the US to remain the world\u2019s primary power, militarily, economically and technologically. The desire to out-compete China is likely to drive policy in the longer-term.<\/p>\n

The 2026 national defense strategy, published in January, states that<\/a> Washington will be \u201cclear-eyed and realistic about the speed, scale, and quality of China\u2019s historic military buildup\u201d and will \u201cprevent anyone, including China, from being able to dominate us or our allies\u201d. The strategy commits the US to deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan by keeping \u201ca strong denial defense along the First Island Chain\u201d north and south of Taiwan. The US secretary of state, Marco Rubio, who accompanied Trump to Beijing, confirmed that US policy on Taiwan has not changed<\/a> as a result of the leaders\u2019 meeting. <\/p>\n

The Trump administration\u2019s approach is driven primarily by economic interests. This is because it believes that \u201cthe Indo-Pacific will soon make up more than half of the global economy\u201d and, according<\/a> to the defense strategy: \u201cWere China\u2026 to dominate this broad and crucial region, it would be able to effectively veto Americans\u2019 access to the world\u2019s economic center of gravity.\u201d <\/p>\n

This means the Trump administration will try to preserve the giant US military presence<\/a> in Asia Pacific that the Chinese see<\/a> as encirclement. <\/p>\n

\u2018Conscious de-coupling\u2019<\/h2>\n

The US president remains a mercurial character who can make unpredictable decisions. He likes to tout his prowess as a dealmaker and it is always possible that he could undermine the consensus view within his own government. But the US Congress is also firmly behind the drive to out-compete China and to \u201cdecouple\u201d in advanced technology<\/a>.<\/p>\n

In July 2025, the bipartisan \u201cOne Big Beautiful Bill\u201d Act (OBBBA)<\/a> included US$58 billion (\u00a343.5 billion) of federal investments in, and tax incentives for, AI production inside the US. These measures barred<\/a> \u201cprohibited foreign entities\u201d from US supply chains. In 2018, Congress passed<\/a> strict new export controls and investment restrictions into law to try to decouple from China in emerging new technologies. The House Select Committee on China is pushing for more of this<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Over the past year, the Trump administration launched a new strategy for rare earth metals. China\u2019s dominance<\/a> of the mining and processing of these metals is a huge advantage \u2013 they are critical to modern weapons systems<\/a> and widely used in electronics<\/a>, from smartphones to EVs. <\/p>\n

In April 2025<\/a>, Beijing began to impose export controls on rare earths in response to US tariffs. Since then, the US has launched a US$7.3 billion<\/a> global effort to secure supplies of rare earths outside China and invest in domestic mining and processing capabilities. While this will take years to come to fruition, the goal is to speed up decoupling from China in rare earths \u2013 hardly a sign of trust. <\/p>\n

Finally, Trump reportedly<\/a> refused to extend the trade truce signed in October 2025 until the end of his administration as he believed he would lose leverage over China in future. It\u2019s a clear sign that even he expects tension in future. <\/p>\n

The Trump administration says that, unlike its predecessors, it is not looking for conflict with China. But its insistence on US dominance of Asia Pacific is likely to drive competition with China in the long-term.<\/p>\n

\"The<\/p>\n

Maria Ryan has received funding from the British Academy. <\/span><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Donald Trump\u2019s appraisal of his recent state visit to China was, typically, positive and self-regarding. At the end of the trip, the US president told reporters that it had achieved \u201ca lot of good\u201d and \u201cfantastic trade deals\u201d had been signed. He concluded that a lot of different problems were settled \u201cthat other people wouldn\u2019t […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-477","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/477","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=477"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/477\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=477"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=477"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=477"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}