Maduro replaced Ch\u00e1vez as president after his death in 2013. And from there, his administration oversaw one of the most severe economic declines in modern history while simultaneously dismantling democratic checks and balances.<\/p>\n
Ideological revision is a perilous moment for revolutionary regimes. Major policy pivots require cautious steering and, without credible and calibrated leadership, they risk overwhelming insular, authoritarian states. <\/p>\n
The Soviet Union is perhaps the most illustrative example of this. It collapsed in 1991 under the weight of popular economic grievances mobilised under newfound freedoms of speech and assembly. <\/p>\n
Keen to avoid a similar fate, the Chinese Communist party studied<\/a> the Soviet Union\u2019s downfall over the next decade. It concluded that the Soviet miscalculation was simultaneous economic and political opening, and has thus limited regime liberalisation to the economy. <\/p>\n In Venezuela, Rodr\u00edguez appears to be following China\u2019s approach. She has maintained tight control of political conditions inside the country, while prioritising economic liberalisation.<\/p>\n Under the acknowledged guidance of US officials, Rodr\u00edguez has unravelled some elements of Maduro\u2019s regime. Thirteen of 32 ministerial positions have been reshuffled in an administration that has long been dominated by military figures and interests. <\/p>\n However, a number of the key power brokers from the Venezuelan armed forces who maintained the Maduro regime remain in government. This includes the interior minister, Diosdado Cabello, and Vladimir Padrino L\u00f3pez, who was dismissed<\/a> from his role as defence minister in March and appointed as agriculture minister instead. <\/p>\n These people have moved into line behind Rodr\u00edguez. Successive US presidents have issued sanctions, bounties and arrest warrants against them, as they have against Rodr\u00edguez. Hers have now been rescinded<\/a>, and other prominent Maduro loyalists will be hoping their compliance brings them the same. <\/p>\n The entire machinery of state and government remains in the hands of the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). This includes the national assembly, supreme court, national electoral administration, police and military. PSUV governors are in place<\/a> in 23 of the country\u2019s 24 states.<\/p>\n And despite demands from Venezuelan opposition figures for presidential elections, the Trump administration and Rodr\u00edguez have thus far avoided committing to a vote. Progress on granting amnesty to Maduro-era political prisoners has also slowed<\/a>.<\/p>\n While more than 2,200 people were released from prison<\/a> or had other legal restrictions withdrawn after the passing of an amnesty law in February, the release of political prisoners has reduced to a trickle. Over 400 of these people remain incarcerated<\/a>, and the amnesty law has been quietly parked for revision. <\/p>\n On the economic front, Rodr\u00edguez has implemented reforms at a greater pace. New laws and regulations reversing Ch\u00e1vez\u2019s nationalisation drive are reopening key sectors of the economy to private investment. This includes hydrocarbons<\/a> and mining<\/a>. <\/p>\n A recently unveiled Commission for the Evaluation of Public Assets will audit state ownership<\/a> in other economic areas such as agriculture, manufacturing and infrastructure. A fire sale to the private sector is expected. <\/p>\n The discipline and political dominance of the PSUV machine have been put to good use here, waving through favourable terms and other confidence-building measures<\/a> for investors. These include providing legal guarantees in what has long been a notoriously unpredictable economic environment, as well as access to international arbitration. Whether these measures encourage investment will become clear in the months ahead.<\/p>\n Rodr\u00edguez has also steered Venezuela back into the International Monetary Fund (IMF), ending a suspension<\/a> that began in 2019 when the organisation ceased recognising Maduro\u2019s government. Kristalina Georgieva, the IMF\u2019s managing director, reports<\/a> having \u201cproductive\u201d conversations with Rodr\u00edguez.<\/p>\n The US president, Donald Trump, has praised Rodr\u00edguez<\/a> for doing a \u201cgreat job\u201d. He has said she is working well with US representatives. But there are many disruptive challenges on the horizon for Rodr\u00edguez. In the short-term, there is a very real risk of protests. Venezuela remains in a political limbo with hopes of justice and democracy currently frustrated.<\/p>\n The absence of demonstrations to date owes much to a lack of leadership on the ground. This is likely to change when opposition leader Maria Corina Machado, who the Maduro government barred from competing in the July 2024 presidential election, returns to the country. Machado has said she<\/a> expects to be back in Venezuela before the end of 2026.<\/p>\n Many had expected Machado to be delivered into the vacated presidency after Maduro\u2019s capture. But Trump declined to support her as the country\u2019s next leader. Even after she gave Trump<\/a> her Nobel Peace Prize medal in January \u2013 and despite her strong friendship with US secretary of state, Marco Rubio \u2013 Machado remains on the periphery of US decision making. <\/p>\nEconomic liberalisation<\/h2>\n
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