But far less attention has been paid to what populists actually do once in office. Where such research exists, it tends to focus on national governments, with only a small body<\/a> examining local politics. Local government, however, is where political promises get a quick reality check.<\/p>\n The gap between Reform\u2019s \u201cpro-workers\u201d rhetoric<\/a> and its party elite\u2019s relatively privileged and pro-business backgrounds has been noted<\/a>. But the party\u2019s first year in local government provides an opportunity to see whether the social groups it claims to represent also tend to benefit from its exercise of power. <\/p>\n While systematic data on the Reform-led councils is yet to be collected, their track record so far has revealed signs of where this party\u2019s interests might lie \u2013 and of what a UK government led by Reform might look like.<\/p>\n According to a recent report<\/a>, climate commitments have been scaled back across Reform-run councils. Net-zero targets have been scrapped and climate language removed from policy documents. These decisions align with the party\u2019s broader critique of climate policy as economically burdensome. <\/p>\n It also aligns with the party\u2019s fossil fuel donors<\/a>, who account for more than two-thirds of Reform\u2019s financial backing. However, it does not necessarily align with the interests of the communities in the councils that it runs.<\/p>\n A good case in point is fracking. Despite its well-known risks<\/a> to water and air quality, as well as concerns over earthquakes and warming effects, Reform\u2019s leadership has endorsed fracking<\/a>. The party has pledged to legalise it if it comes into government.<\/p>\n The country, however, is not as keen. According to the most recent polling<\/a>, only 28% of people in Britain support fracking, compared to 46% opposing it. A survey last year<\/a> found that nothing puts off Reform supporters more than the party\u2019s ties to the fossil fuel industry. Farmers \u2013 40% of whom<\/a> now support Reform \u2013 have a longstanding scepticism<\/a> about fracking due to its potential impact on their crops.<\/p>\n In fact, in two other Reform council areas \u2013 Lancashire<\/a> and Scarborough<\/a>, local representatives have broken from the national party line on fracking. This reflects a broader tension between the interests of its elite backers and those of its popular base.<\/p>\n Those contradictions also become visible in the field of social care. In Derbyshire, the Reform-led council\u2019s plan to shut eight care homes was called a \u201cbetrayal of local people\u201d<\/a>. Similar plans in Lancashire<\/a> entailed the closure of five public care homes as well as five day centres, with residents moved to the private sector.<\/p>\n What is striking is not just the direction of policy, but also the political reaction to it. The privatisation plans in Lancashire were eventually abandoned due to strong local opposition<\/a>, which came not only from rival parties, but also from Reform grassroots members<\/a>. <\/p>\n This underlines an insight often missing from populism research: the category of \u201cordinary people\u201d is not a unified social group. It also indicates the unpopularity of an economic agenda that, with its emphasis on further deregulation, privatisation and tax cuts, might seem to be Thatcherism\u2019s unfinished business<\/a>.<\/p>\n Reform\u2019s neoliberal outlook on the economy is reflected in the range of tax cuts pledged in its 2024 manifesto<\/a>. Ahead of the local elections last year, several Reform candidates<\/a> reiterated these pledges, vowing either to freeze or cut council tax. <\/p>\n The opposite has happened, though. As reported recently<\/a>, nine Reform councils raised Band D council tax for 2026-27 by an average of 3.94%. And while that was lower than the overall average increase of 4.86%, it shows that \u2013 when confronted with budgetary constraints \u2013 Reform is willing to follow the same fiscal patterns as other mainstream parties. In other words, by increasing what is ultimately a regressive tax<\/a> that disproportionately affects poorer households. <\/p>\n This dynamic echoes once again the discrepancy between the party\u2019s \u201cpopulist\u201d image and its neoliberal, austerity-prone policy agenda.<\/p>\n Reform\u2019s track record in these areas of policymaking points to a broader conclusion. Much of the existing literature treats populism primarily as a discursive phenomenon \u2013 a way of framing politics in terms of \u201cthe people\u201d versus \u201cthe elite\u201d. <\/p>\nEnergy: big donors or local interests?<\/h2>\n
Social care: when \u2018populism\u2019 meets the welfare state<\/h2>\n
Taxation: from promises to practice<\/h2>\n
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