For these leaders alone, Trump appears to show respect and deference \u2013 compared to the disdain he demonstrates for most others presidents and prime ministers.<\/p>\n
The 2025 US national security strategy<\/a> was explicit that the western hemisphere should be considered a region of US predominance, and implied that Russia and China could have similar spheres of influence. The US-imposed change of leadership in Venezuela, and support for sympathetic populist regimes in Latin America suggest the US is serious about this. <\/p>\n Putin\u2019s aim to restore Russian control over Ukraine by force of arms, meanwhile, and his use of bribery, threats and subversion to surround Russia with sympathetic regimes in the former Soviet sphere, is equally clear<\/a>.<\/p>\n Xi has made no secret of his aim to recover control over Taiwan<\/a>, and is evidently keen to exert Chinese influence in Myanmar and more broadly in south-east Asia and the South China Sea. <\/p>\n All three appear to regard Europe \u2013 and specifically the European Union \u2013 as an obstacle<\/a> to the acceptance of their worldview. <\/p>\n The EU shows how countries can achieve stability and prosperity by agreeing to share sovereignty and abide by common rules, with human rights and the rule of law at the heart of the arrangement. <\/p>\n The US and Russia both appear bent on weakening Europe by stoking grievances against the established order and supporting anti-EU populist parties<\/a> that they hope will undermine its unity.<\/p>\n Of course, imperialism involves more than just physical control over territory. Ultimately, it\u2019s about who makes the important decisions about resource distribution, trade, security and government. Partly for that reason, in the years after the second world war, the so-called \u201cliberal\u201d international order appeared a lot less liberal to many states who had only recently won their independence. <\/p>\n Many felt that neo-colonial control continued long after the formal reins of power had been handed over through imposed economic and governance norms. For them, imperialism never really went away: it just took new forms.<\/p>\n But the world has changed out of all recognition since the heyday of imperialism in the 19th century. Empire was a common enough form of government for millennia because it was an effective way to bring people of different faiths, cultures, languages and locations under a single authority that imposed order. But it could not survive the rise of nationalism, based around a single culture, ethnicity, language and more centralised government. <\/p>\n This competitive nationalism proved chronically unstable. Though a precarious balance of power kept major conflicts at bay for a while, it led ultimately to the two most destructive world wars in human history between 1914 and 1945. By the end of the latter, mankind had developed the ability to destroy itself utterly \u2013 and world leaders decided there must be a better way of settling differences.<\/p>\n From 43 member states in 1946, the UN has grown to 193 members, many having struggled for an independence they are determined to keep. The post-war multilateral order helped end empires and sought to make the world safe for small countries so that people and land could no longer be traded like properties in a game of Monopoly. <\/p>\n The people themselves, as the Greenlanders<\/a> recently demonstrated, refuse to be traded \u2013 and Iranians as much as Ukrainians have shown they are willing to fight to choose their own government, not have it imposed by others (and it remains to be seen how long Delcy Rodr\u00edguez<\/a> lasts as the US-installed interim president of Venezuela).<\/p>\n Alongside this, trade and technology have transformed relations between people and states. Globalisation may be unfashionable, but it is still a reality. The volume of world trade has increased by about 4,500% since 1950<\/a>, and has underpinned substantial growth in both population and incomes<\/a>. Leaders, democratic or not, need that prosperity to continue if they are to stay in power. <\/p>\n Technology has had an equally profound impact. The internet has connected people around the globe, even if it is dominated by a few US companies and rigorously controlled in a few countries by authoritarian states. And the development of new, effective military tech, such as drones, has transformed the way wars are fought.<\/p>\n We\u2019re seeing that playing out in Iran and Ukraine. In these wars, and in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Gaza, regardless of the imbalance in power, the \u201cweak\u201d have been able to inflict unbearable pain on the \u201cstrong\u201d. Force alone no longer works as a way to settle disputes. It leads instead only to \u201cforever wars\u201d in which no one is willing to admit defeat. <\/p>\n These wars also show that having friends is as important for success as having manpower, money and military equipment. Trump\u2019s dismissive treatment of the US\u2019s traditional allies has done great damage to American power and influence in the world. It will be hard for whoever becomes president in 2028 to repair that.<\/p>\n![\"Winston](\"https:\/\/images.theconversation.com\/files\/769718\/original\/file-20261103-64-rwpuab.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.1&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip\")
\n US government photographer via Wikimedia Commons<\/span><\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\nTowards a new world order<\/h2>\n
![\"The](\"https:\/\/counter.theconversation.com\/content\/295632\/count.gif\")
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