Research in conflict resolution<\/a> suggests that warring parties will be more likely to come to an agreement when both sides can take away what they consider a winning result. Often, this comes in trade-offs between what you are willing to give away in order to gain elsewhere. Nevertheless, it\u2019s axiomatic in conflict resolution that it\u2019s much easier to start a war than to stop it.<\/p>\n The most viable pathway to a settlement remains a reset of the nuclear file broadly along the lines of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)<\/a>, albeit under a new political brand. <\/p>\n Iranian officials have proposed<\/a> a staged arrangement that would cap uranium enrichment at 3.67%, well below the level needed for a nuclear weapon. Such an arrangement would return intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency inspections with the prospect of ultimately transferring stocks of higher\u2011enriched uranium out of the country in exchange for phased sanctions relief. <\/p>\n This would not represent a fundamental concession by Tehran. These were the parameters<\/a> it accepted 11 years ago under the deal brokered by Barack Obama. But it would significantly lengthen Iran\u2019s nuclear \u201cbreakout time\u201d (the time it takes to produce enough weapons-grade uranium). It would also restore transparency that has been steadily eroded since the first Trump administration pulled out of the JCPOA in 2018.<\/p>\n For Washington, such a deal would fall short of longstanding demands for \u201czero enrichment\u201d \u2013 but that position has so far proved unattainable. Even US officials now appear more focused on verifiable constraints than absolute prohibitions, understanding that China<\/a> recognises the right to enrich uranium as a matter of sovereignty. <\/p>\n A capped and monitored programme would allow the US president to claim that Iran had been forced back under strict controls, while avoiding a further costly regional war. The irony is that this would largely put Iran back into an agreement that Obama agreed and which Trump, with considerable bluster, withdrew from in 2018. This appears to be a stumbling block for the US president.<\/p>\n A second and related off\u2011ramp concerns the duration rather than the existence of enrichment limits. Recent talks<\/a> have stalled over US demands for a 20\u2011year moratorium on enrichment, which Iran has countered with proposals closer to five years. A compromise, such as a seven to ten-year limit with built\u2011in reviews, would give both sides something to sell domestically. It would represent long\u2011term risk reduction for Washington and for Tehran it would be a reaffirmation of Iran\u2019s right to a nuclear future. <\/p>\n Time\u2011limited arrangements have precedent in arms control. They are known as confidence and security building measures<\/a> and are often used in conflict prevention and resolution to build trust between parties while working towards a resolution. And they may be more politically durable than maximalist demands that are more likely to collapse as political conditions change.<\/p>\n Beyond the nuclear issue, the Strait of Hormuz has emerged as Iran\u2019s most potent source of leverage. Roughly one-fifth of global oil passes through the waterway, and even limited disruption has sent energy prices climbing this year. Former Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev \u2013 a close ally of Vladimir Putin \u2013 recently described<\/a> the strait as Iran\u2019s \u201creal nuclear weapon\u201d. It\u2019s a comment that captures how central maritime pressure has become to Tehran\u2019s strategy. <\/p>\n An agreement guaranteeing the strait\u2019s unconditional reopening<\/a> without harassment, tolls, or threats, would provide immediate economic relief worldwide and give Washington a highly visible diplomatic win.<\/p>\n But Gulf states have expressed<\/a> concern that such a bargain could end up managing rather than dismantling Iran\u2019s leverage. It would effectively normalise \u2013 rather than remove \u2013 Iran\u2019s ability to threaten shipping during crises. <\/p>\n For neighbouring countries, stabilisation without broader de\u2011escalation risks entrenching a dangerous precedent. This makes it all the more important that any Hormuz\u2011focused deal be tied to wider commitments on restraint and established confidence-building measures.<\/p>\nLowering the stakes<\/h2>\n
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