Burnham\u2019s visit will also have been welcomed by the beleaguered German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, even if it did invite one unkind headline<\/a>: \u201cSuccessful politician in the chancellery \u2013 and Friedrich Merz\u201d. A series of state election defeats and record low approval ratings have sparked rumours that Merz may be replaced<\/a>. <\/p>\n The format of the visit was rather unusual. The only questions permitted were from an audience of schoolchildren lined up behind the leaders in the chancellery. This at least allowed Merz, Burnham and their teams to frame the narrative of the visit firmly around the possibilities of bilateral cooperation.<\/p>\n The official statement<\/a> about the visit reflected this. It talked up and apparently \u201cfinalised the ratification\u201d of the Kensington treaty<\/a>, which was agreed in 2025. While the UK has signed bilateral statements with most EU member states since Brexit in 2020, this is the only one which is a treaty with force in international law. <\/p>\n Some new initiatives were also added in this visit. Burnham extended an invitation to Germany to join<\/a> the Global Combat Air Programme, a fighter jet project led by the UK, Italy and Japan. He also renewed ambition for the UK and Germany to counter hybrid threats together. <\/p>\n Bilateral defence cooperation has been a key theme in recent UK-German relations. This is partly because it is an area where EU competences are less developed, and so the EU is less likely to perceive it as a threat.<\/p>\n Commitments to dialogue on tech (without addressing where the UK sits on regulatory questions where the US and the EU are at odds), space cooperation and quantum technology were also announced. All of these fall in the category of economically worthwhile if politically unchallenging areas. <\/p>\n While Burnham talked up cooperation on tackling irregular migration and Merz pointed to improved arrangements for school exchange, the political hot potato of youth mobility was absent from these talks.<\/p>\n As we heard time and time again in our work, for Germany the relationship with the EU holds primacy over the bilateral relationship with the UK, and under no circumstances should the latter threaten the former. <\/p>\n As one German official we interviewed put it: \u201cIf pressed, Germany would always choose European integration over bilateral ties with the UK.\u201d Another German interviewee added: \u201cIf there is such a thing as a German \u2018reason of state\u2019, then it\u2019s the European Union.\u201d<\/p>\n Consequently, the Kensington treaty is littered with references to the EU and all key tenets were checked with EU institutions to make sure they did not present a problem. For Germany, it appears bilateral relations still come a poor second to shared EU membership. <\/p>\n Merz gave a nod to this in his joint appearance with Burnham. He stated<\/a>: \u201cAfter Great Britain unfortunately left the European Union, we will at least do a bilateral treaty\u201d. <\/p>\n Still, the current relationship between the UK and Germany is a world away from the early post-Brexit years. It reached its low point around 2020 when the Boris Johnson government indicated its willingness to violate the UK\u2019s EU withdrawal agreement, thus breaking international law. Relations have been on an steep, upward trajectory since. <\/p>\n With the EU remaining a focal point in these bilateral relations, this takes us to a pressing question: how far can strong links with Germany improve the UK\u2019s relationship with the EU? <\/p>\n Germany is the largest EU member state and one that saw the UK as a key ally while it was a member of the bloc. In their work<\/a>, UK-based researchers Tim Bale and Karl Pike write of the \u201cMerkel Myth\u201d, whereby the UK consistently overestimated Germany\u2019s willingness to help the UK achieve its goals in its EU relationship. <\/p>\n Our sense is that Germany is willing to be somewhat helpful, seeing itself as a \u201cgrown up\u201d in the EU room and a counterweight to France, which is generally far frostier in its approach to the UK.<\/p>\n Germany tried but could not prevent the collapse of negotiations to include the UK in the EU\u2019s Security Action for Europe (Safe) partnership, and it subsequently worked to ensure that the Ukraine loan facility could include the UK. <\/p>\n Now, similar issues such as the EU\u2019s proposed \u201cMade in Europe\u201d rules are on the horizon. These proposals, which would seriously favour EU producers over those outside, are a real threat to billions of pounds of UK trade with the EU, notably in the automotive sector<\/a>.<\/p>\n In the run-up to the summit, British media reported<\/a> that Burnham was willing to levy higher tariffs on Chinese EV imports in order to secure agreement within the EU to exempt the UK from some of these rules. Germany is also apparently pressing this point<\/a> with the UK. <\/p>\n In managing this bilateral relationship, the UK must tread a careful line. On the one hand, its eyes have to be on the economically and politically important prize of a closer UK-EU relationship, as well as cordial bilateral ties. <\/p>\n On the other, it must avoid the perception that it is driving a wedge between Germany and the European Commission or other member states. Burnham and Merz seemed to avoid that risk in their questions before German schoolchildren, but how far these talks can shift the UK-EU dial remains uncertain.<\/p>\n Ed Turner receives funding from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. <\/span><\/em><\/p>\n Carolyn Rowe receives funding from the DAAD.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n Tobias Hofelich receives funding from the DAAD. <\/span><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Andy Burnham\u2019s decision to choose Berlin for his first trip to an EU member state on October 8 will have delighted many in the German capital\u2019s political circles. In our recent analysis of the UK-Germany relationship, we noted some disappointment among political figures in Berlin that it took Rishi Sunak 18 months to make a […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1970","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1970","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1970"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1970\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1970"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1970"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1970"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}Closer EU relationship<\/h2>\n
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