But, interestingly, the public\u2019s reaction<\/a> has been considerably more positive, reflecting changing views over what Britons consider fair and acceptable around elderly care and incomes.<\/p>\n Despite some of the headlines, the triple lock is not being scrapped. Rather, the government\u2019s proposed reform<\/a> from 2030 envisions the state pension rising each year by the highest of inflation, 2.5%, or whatever is needed to keep pace with earnings.<\/p>\n What is being scrapped is the mechanism that pushes the pension ever higher relative to wages. Under the current rules, whenever inflation or the 2.5% floor outpaces earnings growth, the pension gets a bigger rise than wages that year \u2013 and keeps that gain permanently. <\/p>\n For the rest of the population, wage growth tends to be a response to inflation \u2013 but under the triple lock, pensioners feel the benefit of both (so-called \u201cdouble counting\u201d). The new rule would still protect pensions against inflation and keep them in line with earnings over time, but would stop these one-off gains from building up year after year.<\/p>\n According to the Institute for Fiscal Studies<\/a>, had this been applied since 2010, the UK state pension would still have grown 6% faster than prices \u2013 but the government would be spending \u00a39 billion a year less than it is today.<\/p>\n Pensions are an age-sensitive issue, and age is increasingly the biggest divide<\/a> in British politics.<\/p>\n At the 2024 election, the gap between young and old in support for the main parties was around 30 points<\/a>. On anything from immigration<\/a> to climate action<\/a>, opinions are hugely split along age lines. <\/p>\n Yet pensions are the exception. In 2021, a YouGov poll found<\/a> that 68% of Britons wanted to keep the triple lock, and just 11% wanted to scrap it. Even 18- to 29-year-olds backed it by 53% to 12%.<\/p>\n As recently as May, support still outweighed opposition among 18- to 34-year-olds by 44% to 22%<\/a>. Older people hold firmer views, but no age group has ever wanted it gone.<\/p>\n This is not because young people think the system is fair. The same 2021 survey found that only around a quarter of under-40s thought it fair for pensions to rise while workers\u2019 earnings fell, compared with nearly two-thirds of over-60s. <\/p>\n Nor is it because they expect the same deal: most Britons<\/a> think they will have lower standards in retirement. So what holds the consensus together?<\/p>\n Part of the answer lies in the family. Almost three in ten Britons under the age of 60<\/a> expect to give significant financial or practical help to an older relative within the next decade. This research found that asking younger people to consider their own future pensions did nothing to raise their support for government spending on older people.<\/p>\n The only message that increased support for spending on older people was one that stressed how it would ease the burden of looking after parents and grandparents.<\/p>\n The link runs the other way too. Older Britons whose younger relatives are struggling<\/a> are more supportive of spending on education, childcare and housing. This is driven more by concern for those relatives than by self-interest.<\/p>\n In other words, voters don\u2019t see pensions as a transfer from young to old, but as support that flows through families in both directions. That\u2019s why, unlike most issues, they don\u2019t pit the generations against each other.<\/p>\n And these ties are growing tighter: 43% of 25-year-olds<\/a> still live with their parents. But this \u201cprivileged dependence\u201d<\/a> helps only those whose families can afford it.<\/p>\n My research points to a further reason for the relative consensus: economic issues divide generations far less than cultural ones. In a survey experiment<\/a> using appeals adapted from the 2019 UK general election manifestos, I found that older voters did not penalise candidates who promised to prioritise the young.<\/p>\n This was true even when the candidate said it was time to shift attention away from the elderly. Economic appeals moved voters of all ages more than cultural ones did.<\/p>\n As with any research looking into economic policy preferences, the catch comes around who is expected to pay for them. None of the appeals in my experiment asked older voters to pay for anything, but Burnham\u2019s reform does. It asks pensioners to accept slower growth in their own income.<\/p>\n At the same time, it channels the savings into something older voters want: 80% of over-50s<\/a> back a National Care Service that is free at the point of use. Across the under-50s too, net support for this exceeds 60%, reflecting appetite for reforms that focus on care provision beyond mere income protection.<\/p>\n The early polling suggests Burnham\u2019s triple lock gamble is less dangerous than it looks, with Britons supporting the plan<\/a> by 48% to 28%.<\/p>\nThe issue that doesn\u2019t split generations<\/h2>\n
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\n Steve Travelguide\/Shutterstock<\/a><\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\nBurnham\u2019s real test<\/h2>\n
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