Importantly, the figures only included people who they spoke with who appeared to meet the established criteria for PTSD\/CPTSD. Many more displayed symptoms of deep trauma. More than 71% of respondents said their neighbourhood had been hit by shelling, 44.5% had either lost or had a loved one seriously injured as a result of the conflict and nearly 33% had either been displaced from their home or their loved ones as a result of the war.<\/p>\n
This war cannot end soon enough. But the effects of the trauma on Ukrainian people will take a long time to heal.<\/p>\n
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\n To make matters worse, Russia is now hitting Ukrainian cities with a new class of jet-powered drones which are proving far more difficult to defend against. Air force spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat told the Financial Times recently that Ukraine was intercepting only about 60% of attacks by the new Geran-5 drone, compared with a success rate of 95% previously. <\/p>\n The Geran-5 is apparently more like a cruise missile than a drone and can go higher, further and \u2013 crucially \u2013 faster than the drones previously used by Russia. Marina Miron and Rod Thornton of the War Studies team at King\u2019s College London have been researching the drones and assess what makes them so dangerous<\/a> for Ukraine\u2019s defenders.<\/p>\n \n Meanwhile, it was reported recently that the US president, Donald Trump, has been urging Volodymyr Zelensky, to stop his military from targeting Russian oil facilities. Ukraine has waged a particularly successful campaign against refineries this year, reportedly hitting one every three days in the first eight months of the year. The potential effect on duel prices is apparently what is bothering the US president<\/p>\n Asked about this after the pair met on the sidelines of last week\u2019s UN general assembly meeting, Zelensky reportedly said he\u2019d told Trump that any concessions must go both ways and that Russia must agree not to target Ukraine\u2019s energy infrastructure (it hasn\u2019t). <\/p>\n This isn\u2019t the first time a US president has tried to dictate how Ukraine defends itself against Russian aggression. Joe Biden refused to give permission for Kyiv to use American long-range missiles to hit targets inside Russia, for fear of how Putin might retaliate (there was a lot of talk of a nuclear response at the time).<\/p>\n As David Galbreath notes<\/a>, the two presidents may have had different strategic motives, but their demands appear to reflect a belief in Washington that the US can legitimately try to control the way Ukraine defends itself. Whether, and for how long this belief remains realistic, must these days be a matter for debate.<\/p>\n \n More than two decades after George W Bush declared \u201cmission accomplished\u201d in Iraq, the final US units moved out of the country this week. The final withdrawal, on September 30, was supposed to happen on the same day as the deadline for the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and other armed factions to be brought under state control. But the latter has yet to happen.<\/p>\n And, given the PMF and many of the other armed groups have close links with Iran, the extent that they will be brought under Iraqi control must remain a subject of some debate.<\/p>\n But all in all US withdrawal will be seen in Tehran as something of a bonus. Iran has spent the past two decades cultivating networks of influence inside Iraq. Military ties with armed groups such as the PMF are well known. But Tehran has also developed strong economic and, crucially, political links with powerful groups in Iraq.<\/p>\n Middle East expert Bamo Nouri points out that these ties will be invaluable for Iran<\/a> when it comes to circumventing Washington\u2019s sanctions. US withdrawal effectively leaves Iran with a pressure valve against the isolation that Washington has been driving so hard to enforce.<\/p>\n \n When European defence ministers got together in Brussels this week to discuss collective response to Russian aggression, once of the main topics of conversation was the Kremlin\u2019s use of hybrid warfare. This is generally understood as the sort of hostile acts that stop short of actual military conflict. <\/p>\n It can include things like sabotage, disinformation, airspace violations, political interference and cyberwarfare. We\u2019ve seen some evidence of this throughout Europe in recent years, but in the Baltic states they\u2019ve been putting up with it for decades. <\/p>\n Alex Hardy is working with the Estonian government to develop ways to counter this strategy. Here he reveals how this might work<\/a>.<\/p>\n
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\n One in three Ukrainian civilians estimated to meet the criteria for PTSD or complex PTSD \u2013 new study<\/a>
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\n Russia\u2019s new jet-powered drones mark latest evolution in air war above Ukraine<\/a>
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\nUS restrictions<\/h2>\n
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\n US attempts to control Ukraine\u2019s attacks on Russia reflect a fundamental strategic disconnect<\/a>
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\nUS leaves Iraq after 23 years<\/h2>\n
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\n America\u2019s final military withdrawal from Iraq is a major bonus for Iran<\/a>
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\nBaltics brace for hybrid war from Moscow<\/h2>\n
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