At the same time, securing legitimacy for a new electoral system is vital. We do not want the system to become a political football, kicked around by successive governments in response to their particular needs. Something like that has happened in Italy over recent decades<\/a>, and it harms confidence in democracy. <\/p>\n So far as possible, such fundamental rules of the game as the voting system should be decided not by the players of the game \u2013 politicians \u2013 and far less by one of the sides in that game \u2013 the government of the day \u2013 but by the political community as a whole. The standard way for generating consent in a democracy is through elections, based on manifesto commitments. But a manifesto commitment alone would be an insufficient basis for changing the electoral system with legitimacy. This is an issue of the highest importance for our democracy; but it will not be the main factor in most voters\u2019 decision-making when the cost of living, the future of social care, and the security of the country\u2019s borders are also on the ballot paper. Majority victory for a party promising this change would give only a weak signal of public consent to it. <\/p>\n This is why Burnham\u2019s pledge to establish a national commission on the issue is crucial. To confer the legitimacy that any reform would require, such a commission will need to satisfy three conditions. <\/p>\n First, it will need to be inclusive, bringing members of the public into the discussion as far as possible. The last commission to examine the voting system \u2013 the Jenkins Commission<\/a> established by Tony Blair in 1997 \u2013 comprised five members of the great and the good. Much as they tried to consult widely, such an exclusive process would not be credible today. It will be important to stimulate national discussion of the issue, and to engage a cross-section of the public in detailed examination of the options.<\/p>\n Second, the commission will need to be open-minded as to the outcome it might reach. A process that appears to have been designed to deliver a particular result will not be taken seriously by those who oppose this direction of travel. The status quo will need to be an option considered on equal merits with the alternatives. Those alternatives should include majoritarian options such as AV, a variety of proportional systems (such as list systems and single transferable vote), and intermediate arrangements. <\/p>\n Third, the commission will want to draw on expert analysis. Advocates of different electoral systems make numerous claims about the effects that different systems would have in the UK \u2013 not just upon election results in themselves, but also upon rates of election turnout, the culture of politics, the stability and effectiveness of government, and outcomes such as economic growth and inequality. Such claims will need to be evaluated carefully against all the available evidence. We at the UCL Constitution Unit<\/a> will be launching a project next week to do just that. Many other experts will have much to say as well. It will be essential to hear a wide range of voices.<\/p>\n What would a national commission look like that met these design requirements? In fact, a cross-party group of MPs \u2013 the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Fair Elections \u2013 published a very credible proposal<\/a> last year. This involved a tripartite structure: an independent commission of seven members who would steer the overall process; an expert panel who would provide \u201cpolitically impartial advice and evidence\u201d; and a voters\u2019 forum \u2013 a citizens\u2019 assembly of around 100 members, who would hear the options, deliberate in depth, and make recommendations. <\/p>\n1. Secure public involvement<\/h2>\n
2. Don\u2019t aim for a particular result<\/h2>\n
3. Listen to the experts<\/h2>\n
A credible proposal is already available<\/h2>\n
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