For this diplomacy to bear fruit, Trump and Xi have to develop what is known as \u201csecurity dilemma sensibility\u201d<\/a>. This is the ability to recognise that an adversary may be acting out of fear and not predatory intent and to appreciate how one\u2019s own state\u2019s actions have contributed to that fear. If Trump and Xi can do this, it could create an opening for policies of reciprocal reassurance.<\/p>\n In our new book<\/a> we argue that face-to-face diplomacy offers leaders an opportunity to examine these questions directly and explore what reassurance could involve. <\/p>\n Each of the two leaders need to acknowledge how their own country\u2019s actions contribute to the other\u2019s insecurity. Trust may develop out of such a shared understanding, but recognising an adversary\u2019s fears does not require accepting their claims. What it does do is open the path to new policies of reassurance and restraint. <\/p>\n This summit is an important opportunity for the US and Chinese presidents to show each other that they are exercising security dilemma sensibility, especially in relation to those issues (Taiwan and AI) that could if left unmanaged plunge the two sides into deeper confrontation.<\/p>\n There are lessons to be taken from the relationship between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s. When the two leaders met for their first summit in Geneva in November 1985, it was against the backdrop of a tense superpower relationship in the first part of the 1980s, especially Soviet fears that the United States was planning to launch a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union under the cover of Nato\u2019s November 1983 Able Archer exercise.<\/p>\n Gorbachev came to power as general secretary of the Soviet Union in March 1985. He had a reputation as a pragmatist and reformer who wanted to reduce global tensions and curb the expensive nuclear arms race. <\/p>\n In their first private conversation, Reagan proposed examining the suspicions driving the arms race. Gorbachev argued that cooperation did not require either country to change its political system and that it was possible to advance one superpower\u2019s interests without undermining that of the other.<\/p>\n On the all-important nuclear question, their joint statement declared<\/a> that \u201ca nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought\u201d. Crucially, and often overlooked, they also pledged that: \u201cThey will not seek to achieve military superiority.\u201d <\/p>\n These commitments publicly acknowledged a common interest in preventing nuclear war. Their statement agreed to \u201cstudy the question at the expert level of centers to reduce nuclear risk\u201d and \u201ctook satisfaction in such recent steps in this direction as the modernization of the Soviet-US hotline\u201d.<\/p>\n This led to the development of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) in 1987. These were described by the US Department of State<\/a> as \u201cspecialized 24\/7 government communications hubs \u2026 to lower the risk of accidental nuclear war\u201d.<\/p>\n So while the Geneva summit did not eliminate superpower competition, it established a framework on which further cooperation could build.<\/p>\n While nuclear fears were at the top of the agenda for Reagan and Gorbachev, AI is the burning issue for Trump and Xi. There have already been some positive steps. On September 21, US treasury secretary, Scott Bessent, said Washington and Beijing had agreed to establish a formal AI dialogue<\/a>, including an incident line. Further talks are planned in Shenzhen later in the year. <\/p>\nReagan and Gorbachev\u2019s nuclear rapport<\/h2>\n
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\n UN National Archives<\/a><\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\nCould AI provide a similar opening?<\/h2>\n
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