{"id":1384,"date":"2026-08-13T11:07:31","date_gmt":"2026-08-13T11:07:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/2026\/08\/13\/russia-bets-on-ballistic-missiles-to-combat-the-success-of-ukraines-drone-warfare\/"},"modified":"2026-08-13T11:07:31","modified_gmt":"2026-08-13T11:07:31","slug":"russia-bets-on-ballistic-missiles-to-combat-the-success-of-ukraines-drone-warfare","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/2026\/08\/13\/russia-bets-on-ballistic-missiles-to-combat-the-success-of-ukraines-drone-warfare\/","title":{"rendered":"Russia bets on ballistic missiles to combat the success of Ukraine\u2019s drone warfare"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has regularly targeted civilians and civilian infrastructure with <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2026\/8\/11\/russian-attacks-kill-six-in-ukraines-zaporizhzhia\">missile attacks<\/a>. The strategy adopted by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, and his generals is two-fold: to increase the cost of continuing to resist and to erode civilian morale.<\/p>\n<p>The attacks have aimed to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.co.uk\/news\/articles\/c330pxyvzzyo\">disrupt and destroy<\/a> Ukraine\u2019s military supply and logistics capabilities, its <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2025\/nov\/09\/ukraine-facing-widespread-power-cuts-after-generating-capacity-reduced-to-zero-by-russian-attacks\">power generation<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/news.un.org\/en\/story\/2026\/07\/1167875\">civilian housing<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>The war on the front lines has reached a bloody stalemate, with ever-increasing casualties, especially on the Russian side where more troops are being killed or injured each month than <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/russian-blood-and-treasure-ballooning-costs-putins-war\">can be recruited and trained<\/a>. So Russia\u2019s air campaign conducted behind the front line is clearly seen by the Kremlin as having major strategic value.<\/p>\n<p>Major-General Vadym Skibitsky, the deputy head of Ukraine\u2019s military intelligence directorate, said on August 10 that Russia has <a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/TheStudyofWar\/status\/2086990600180547935\/photo\/1\">restructured its defence production<\/a> to prioritise the production of long-range ballistic and cruise missiles. It is also reportedly <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.co.uk\/news\/articles\/c151dpzwnvxo\">receiving missiles<\/a> from allies such as North Korea (which is also <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2026\/aug\/10\/ukraine-war-briefing-north-korea-sending-50000-troops-to-russia-zelenskyy\">sending 50,000 more troops<\/a> to fight in Ukraine). <\/p>\n<p>With the ground war in Ukraine not developing as they wish, Moscow\u2019s military planners increasingly view the Ukrainian homeland as a potential weak link.<\/p>\n<p>Russia will be well aware of reports that the war in Iran has massively depleted US <a href=\"https:\/\/edition.cnn.com\/2026\/08\/07\/europe\/ballistic-missiles-russia-ukraine-explained-intl\">stocks of air defence systems<\/a>, particularly the Patriot (which stands for phased array tracking radar for intercept on target) and Thaad (terminal high altitude area defense). These are both costly and take a considerable time to replace. US-based thinktank the Center for Strategic and International Studies <a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/rebuilding-us-missile-inventory-multiyear-project\">estimates<\/a> it could take between three and eight years for America to replenish its stocks to the levels they were at before the conflict began at the end of February. <\/p>\n<p>A single Thaad interceptor missile is reported to cost <a href=\"https:\/\/thehill.com\/policy\/defense\/5713637-lockheed-martin-quadruples-thaad\/\">US$12.77 million<\/a> (\u00a39.5 million), while Patriots cost around <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/world\/why-does-it-take-years-to-get-a-patriot-missile-from-factory-to-front-line-3e5874c5\">US$4 million<\/a> each.<\/p>\n<p>With no end to the US conflict against Iran in sight, Patriot missiles will be prioritised for this theatre. And, while there has been discussion of Ukraine being licensed to build its own Patriots, this would take years. The coming winter looks to be <a href=\"https:\/\/www.hudson.org\/national-security-defense\/helping-ukraine-prepare-another-winter-russian-air-strikes-luke-coffey\">extremely challenging<\/a> for Ukraine. <\/p>\n<p>As combat operations slow on the front lines, Russia will look to use its missile capability to cause increased hardship and suffering. As in <a href=\"https:\/\/ukraine.un.org\/en\/308302-deadly-russian-strikes-push-civilians-deeper-winter-crisis\">previous years<\/a>, there will be a concerted campaign targeting Ukraine\u2019s energy infrastructure. A lack of air defence systems means more Russian missiles will be able to hit their targets. <\/p>\n<p>In early August, Ukraine\u2019s defence minister, Mikhailo Federov (who has since been removed from post) said <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/europe-patriot-missile-ukraine-russia-war-winter-attack\/\">\u201cOver the last few months, Russia fires more missiles a week at us than we get from partners over months.\u201d<\/a>. Only 29 out of 195 Russian ballistic missiles were successfully intercepted in July.<\/p>\n<p>Kyiv\u2019s European allies <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/europe-patriot-missile-ukraine-russia-war-winter-attack\/\">are trying<\/a> to go at least some way towards filling the gap. But they need to maintain their own stockpiles to ensure their own security and fulfill their Nato obligations. <\/p>\n<h2>Drones: advantages and limitations<\/h2>\n<p>But this doesn\u2019t mean Ukraine is unable to mount its own offensive strategy. Kyiv has been <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/live\/2026\/aug\/10\/ukraine-drones-russia-oil-facilities-europe-heat-drought-latest-updates-news\">using drones<\/a> to attack key targets: oil storage and refinery facilities, designed to increase pressure on the Russian economy and its ability to export oil on the black market. It is also hitting road and rail infrastructure and bridges, particularly in and around Crimea in a bid to isolate the peninsula. <\/p>\n<p>And, as of August 8, Ukraine\u2019s Unmanned Systems Forces <a href=\"https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/12-russian-shadow-fleet-vessels-struck-in-black-sea-and-azov-sea-over-past-week-ukraine-says\/\">claim to have struck<\/a> 218 Russian shadow fleet vessels, including 134 in the Sea of Azov and 84 in the Black Sea \u2013 another blow to Russia\u2019s oil economy.<\/p>\n<p>Ukraine has also conducted strikes on at least 20 <a href=\"https:\/\/theconversation.com\/ukraine-assault-on-russian-retail-giant-wildberries-brings-war-home-to-consumers-and-retailers-289164\">Wildberries warehouses<\/a>. Wildberries is an e-commerce giant, Russia\u2019s answer to Amazon and an important <a href=\"https:\/\/www.independent.co.uk\/news\/world\/europe\/ukraine-war-wildberries-warehouse-map-russia-b3029122.html\">supplier of battlefield equipment<\/a> for the Russian military. It also stores and sells goods produced by third-party small and medium-sized firms. The loss of inventory and lack of compensation for those losses, is putting a lot of private business under threat of collapse. <\/p>\n<p>These attacks will take time to have a material effect on the Russian economy. But Russia\u2019s central bank <a href=\"https:\/\/defence24.com\/geopolitics\/the-economic-crisis-in-russia-is-becoming-more-visible\">has downgraded<\/a> its economic growth forecasts, inflation is at an average of 7% a year and interest rates are running at 14%<\/p>\n<p>The use of drones as an instrument of strategy, however, <a href=\"https:\/\/mwi.westpoint.edu\/the-drone-revolution-that-isnt\/\">is limited<\/a>. While they are cheaper and easier to replace, most drones don\u2019t have the same firepower as most ballistic missiles. Ukraine is reportedly developing and deploying improved drones with greater range, <a href=\"https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/kyiv-has-developed-new-list-of-priority-targets-for-deep-strikes-in-russia-zelensky-says\/\">enabling Kyiv<\/a> to hit targets deep inside Russia. But on the whole the power of Ukraine\u2019s drones, thus far at least, is considerably less devastating than Russia\u2019s missiles. <\/p>\n<p>So it\u2019s harder for Ukraine drone strikes to break the will of either the government or population the way Putin is hoping Russia\u2019s onslaught of ballistic missiles might.<\/p>\n<p>The Russian president and his military planners will see Ukraine\u2019s challenges in maintaining its missile defence capability as an opportunity to put Ukraine under severe pressure. <\/p>\n<p>Unless President Volodymyr Zelensky and his war planners can find a way to solve this increasingly urgent problem, this winter could be the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cnbc.com\/2026\/08\/03\/ukraine-russia-war-putin-zelenskyy-winter.html\">harshest of the war to date<\/a> for the Ukrainian people.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/counter.theconversation.com\/content\/289639\/count.gif\" alt=\"The Conversation\" width=\"1\" height=\"1\" \/><\/p>\n<p class=\"fine-print\"><em><span>Matthew Powell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has regularly targeted civilians and civilian infrastructure with missile attacks. The strategy adopted by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, and his generals is two-fold: to increase the cost of continuing to resist and to erode civilian morale. The attacks have aimed to disrupt and destroy [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1384","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1384","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1384"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1384\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1384"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1384"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/redzine.co.uk\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1384"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}