One example was his 2011 decision to lower the mandatory retirement age<\/a> for Hungarian judges and prosecutors from 70 to 62. This forced a large proportion of the country\u2019s judiciary into retirement, allowing Orb\u00e1n to replace them with party loyalists. The European Court of Justice ruled against the change<\/a> in 2013, but many of Orb\u00e1n\u2019s appointees remained in their positions. <\/p>\n Orb\u00e1n\u2019s continued defiance of EU policies eventually resulted in the suspension of his Fidesz party from the powerful European People\u2019s Party grouping in the European parliament. Its membership of the alliance was terminated two years later. The European Commission\u2019s 2022 decision to withhold \u20ac30 billion<\/a> (\u00a326.1 billion) in funds from Hungary caused relations to plummet further. <\/p>\n And Orb\u00e1n subsequently sought to leverage the EU\u2019s need for solidarity and unanimity to support Ukraine and sanction Russia. Hungarian obstinance and disruption became so frequent that the country has been described<\/a> by some political figures in Europe as not being aligned with European or Ukrainian interests when it comes to Russia.<\/p>\n In a thinly veiled reference to Orb\u00e1n during a 2024 parliamentary speech, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said<\/a>: \u201cThere are still some who blame this war not on the invader but on the invaded. Not on Putin\u2019s lust for power but on Ukraine\u2019s thirst for freedom. So I want to ask them: would they ever blame the Hungarians for the Soviet invasion of 1956?\u201d<\/p>\n A true low point in EU-Hungary relations was reached in early April 2026 when leaked audio recordings<\/a> showed Orb\u00e1n and his foreign minister, Peter Szijjarto, actively coordinating with the Russian government. The recordings show that Szijj\u00e1rt\u00f3 had used breaks in closed EU ministerial sessions two years earlier to call his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, and brief him on the state of internal discussions. <\/p>\n Szijj\u00e1rt\u00f3 is also accused of sharing confidential documents with Lavrov relating to minority language requirements in Ukraine\u2019s EU accession negotiations. The French foreign minister, Jean-No\u00ebl Barrot, has described this<\/a> as a \u201cbetrayal\u201d. Had Orb\u00e1n managed to prevail in the recent elections, the relationship between the EU and Hungary is likely to have reached a breaking point.<\/p>\n As it is, EU officials will be breathing a sigh of relief. The incoming prime minister, P\u00e9ter Magyar, has a huge incentive to restore Hungary\u2019s relations with the EU \u2013 if for no other reason than to secure the release of roughly \u20ac17 billion in allocated EU funds that are still suspended. Warmer relations would also help Hungary access a possible further \u20ac17 billion in discounted defence loans. <\/p>\n Given the global economic ramifications of the war in Iran and the costs Magyar will incur as he reforms and dismantles Orb\u00e1n\u2019s oligarchic economic system, his government will rely on these funds to ease some of the budgetary pressures they will face. <\/p>\n However, unfreezing these funds is not a foregone conclusion. Von der Leyen has already announced<\/a> that reforms will need to be made in order to achieve this and has presented Hungary\u2019s incoming government with 27 conditions<\/a> that will need to be satisfied. <\/p>\n Some of these reforms will be relatively easy for Magyar to achieve. For instance, tackling corruption was an explicit part of Tisza\u2019s election manifesto. However, other EU funds that were suspended due to infringements on LGBTQ+ rights or asylum procedures will be more politically costly to access. <\/p>\n Hungarians remain deeply conservative and more eurosceptic<\/a> than the average European. According to a 2025 survey conducted on behalf of the European Commission, only 55% of Hungarians consider the country\u2019s EU membership to be \u201ca good thing\u201d. This is lower than the EU average of 62%. Reforms that are seen to be at odds with Hungarian values may thus provoke domestic resistance.<\/p>\n Perhaps of most global interest will be how Magyar approaches the war in Ukraine. He has indicated an interest in rapprochement with Ukraine as part of his broader goal of realigning Hungary with the EU and Nato. Most notably, he has stated that Orb\u00e1n should lift his veto<\/a> on the provision of a \u20ac90 billion EU loan to Ukraine. <\/p>\n However, there may also be more continuity with the Orb\u00e1n regime than those in Brussels might like. Magyar has stated that<\/a> he intends to continue importing Russian energy until at least 2035 and that he will need to put any future possibility of Ukrainian EU membership<\/a> to a referendum. <\/p>\nRupture or continuity?<\/h2>\n
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