The plane could also participate in Nato-led missions, including protecting European skies against capable and determined adversaries. Japan too needs a fighter jet up to the task of protecting a large maritime region<\/a> against incursions of its airspace.<\/p>\n So can these three partner nations succeed where FCAS failed<\/a> and build a truly state-of-the-art combat aircraft?<\/p>\n The most advanced fighter jets in the world are known as \u201cfifth generation\u201d. Tempest is classed as a sixth generation fighter jet<\/a>. China and Russia have fifth generation aircraft and are working on their own sixth generation combat jets. <\/p>\n Many European nations have been replacing their ageing fleets with America\u2019s fifth generation F-35 aircraft. But the Trump administration\u2019s wavering levels of support for Nato have made some governments rethink their reliance<\/a> on American hardware. <\/p>\n This underlines the importance of sovereign capability for the nations behind GCAP, which was established in 2022<\/a>. On July 3 2026, the UK, Italy and Japan signed a \u00a34.6 billion deal<\/a> to move the project into its next design phase. <\/p>\n The contract was awarded to Edgewing, a joint venture<\/a> between three aerospace companies: the UK\u2019s BAE Systems, Italy\u2019s Leonardo and the Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement Company (which is jointly funded by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and the Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies). <\/p>\n The award followed nine months of delay<\/a> as the UK worked to finalise its defence spending plans.<\/p>\n What will distinguish sixth generation fighter jets from their predecessors is their ability to act as a \u201csystem of systems\u201d. They will be packed with sensors to gather information about the battlespace. This will be combined in real time, along with data from satellites, naval assets and ground stations, to aid pilots in their missions. <\/p>\n Advanced jets like Tempest will be able to control drone aircraft, including a type called \u201cloyal wingmen\u201d. These drones assist missions by, for example, protecting the crewed fighter jet. <\/p>\n Meanwhile, stealth technology \u2013 which helps fighter jets reduce their chances of being detected by infrared and radar sensors \u2013 will be just as vital as it has been for fifth generation aircraft like the F-35. <\/p>\n So do GCAP partner nations have the technological capability to build such an aircraft? Yes, with a couple of caveats. In 2016, Japan became only the fourth country to test-fly a homegrown stealth demonstrator<\/a> aircraft. <\/p>\n The Mitsubishi-built X-2 prototype demonstrated the success of Japan\u2019s domestic stealth design and engineering techniques, its radar-absorbent materials and thrust vectoring (an aircraft\u2019s ability to steer by changing the direction of its engine exhaust).<\/p>\n The UK flew its own<\/a> stealth demonstrator, BAE Systems\u2019 Taranis drone, in 2013. It showed the success of British-developed stealth technology and autonomous systems technology. Both stealth programmes have fed directly into GCAP; BAE Systems and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries are the same companies designing Tempest.<\/p>\n Italy and Japan also host F-35 final assembly lines<\/a>, the only such facilities outside the US<\/a>. This has created a workforce already experienced in the assembly of a fifth generation stealth jet, along with the production of full wings for the F-35. These skills transfer directly to building Tempest.<\/p>\n What remains unproven by the GCAP partners is the ability to integrate stealth, combined data from multiple aircraft sensors, and artificial intelligence into a single aircraft. Another uncertainty is the ability to sustain a production line of aircraft destined for national fleets. This is a harder engineering problem than it might seem and deserves closer scrutiny than it currently receives.<\/p>\n The FCAS project succumbed to disputes between the industrial partners, France\u2019s Dassault and Airbus, representing Germany and Spain. Sticking points included which company led the design, the distribution of work and intellectual property issues. <\/p>\n Do the GCAP partners have the industrial and organisational discipline to avoid the same fate? GCAP\u2019s Edgewing industrial venture reflects in its structure key principles<\/a> that could prove vital for the project\u2019s success. <\/p>\n The GCAP industrial partners each hold an equal 33.3% stake<\/a>, with no single nation designated as lead. They have freedom to act on and modify the technology. This is a far cry from the F-35, where partner nations fly the aircraft with no control over changes to modernise the jet\u2019s hardware or software, which is overseen by the US.<\/p>\n GCAP is not immune to future problems, but it settled its industrial leadership question before cutting metal, a distinction that may matter more than any single technological choice.<\/p>\n Inaccurate budgeting could yet prove a stumbling block for GCAP. Historically, multinational fighter jet programmes have underestimated the true costs<\/a>.<\/p>\n Even after the Defence Investment Plan\u2019s \u00a38.6 billion commitment, the total cost of GCAP remains unquantified<\/a>, since neither the unit price of each aircraft nor the size of the UK\u2019s order has been fixed.<\/p>\n History tells us that pilot training is another thing combat air programmes get wrong. As a pilot myself, I know that moving experienced crews onto a new aircraft, even a mature one, takes months of study in ground school, extensive simulator time and supervised flying before it is trusted for operational use. <\/p>\nEqual terms<\/h2>\n
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