This is not the first time Zelensky has reshuffled his defence team. Oleksii Reznikov, who had been defence minister since 2021, was dismissed in 2023<\/a> following a string of high-profile corruption scandals. <\/p>\n He was replaced by Rustem Umerov who, after two years in office, was moved<\/a> to the role of secretary of Ukraine\u2019s National Security and Defence Council, as part of a full-scale cabinet reshuffle. <\/p>\n Umerov\u2019s replacement, former prime minister Denys Shmyhal, lasted almost exactly six months before another reshuffle linked to the long fallout from the corruption scandals of summer 2025. Shmyhal was moved to the energy ministry and replaced by Fedorov<\/a>.<\/p>\n What distinguishes Fedorov\u2019s ousting is that this is the first time a reshuffle has been carried out for reasons of internal disagreement within Zelensky\u2019s core team. <\/p>\n In a press conference on July 16, Fedorov accused the commander-in-chief of Ukraine\u2019s armed forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi, of blocking his reform<\/a> initiatives and dividing the country<\/a>. Their rift had become increasingly public. Fedorov and Syrskyi had apparently each demanded<\/a> that the other be dismissed, rather than finding the compromise Zelensky wanted<\/a>.<\/p>\n That the president sided with the commander-in-chief rather than his defence minister seemingly defies all logic. Fedorov had been an advocate of drone warfare during his earlier tenure<\/a> as Ukraine\u2019s minister for digital transformation, a role he assumed at the beginning of Zelensky\u2019s tenure as president in 2019. <\/p>\n Since Fedorov was appointed<\/a> minister of defence in January, Ukraine has made significant progress in stalling Russia\u2019s momentum<\/a> in the war. Key to this has been an intensified campaign of strikes<\/a> against Russian oil infrastructure \u2013 one of the backbones of the country\u2019s war economy.<\/p>\n Fedorov also moved to reform procurement policies<\/a> in the defence ministry. In June, he stated that his team\u2019s efforts to enforce competitive tendering for defence contracts had saved more than US$100 million<\/a> (\u00a374 million) by cutting the costs of 155mm artillery shells. <\/p>\n This is one probable source<\/a> of Fedorov\u2019s conflict with Syrskyi, who decides which weapons systems and military equipment should be procured. More than an issue of corruption, the rift is about control \u2013 and a clash of cultures between the moderniser, Fedorov, and the more traditional military leadership around Syrskyi. <\/p>\n After his dismissal, Fedorov apparently refused to continue in an advisory role for Zelensky. Two key advisors<\/a> in the defence ministry, Serhii \u201cFlash\u201d Beskrestnov and Serhii Sternenko, as well as the deputy commander of the air force<\/a>, Pavlo Yelizarov, have all now resigned. <\/p>\n These developments further underline the internal strategic disagreements over the direction of Ukraine\u2019s war effort.<\/p>\n Zelensky\u2019s initial choice for his next defence minister was Ihor Klymenko, who apparently declined<\/a> the role and is set to take up<\/a> the post of secretary of Ukraine\u2019s National Security and Defence Council instead. <\/p>\n As a former national police chief who had been Ukraine\u2019s interior minister since 2023, Klymenko was seen as someone<\/a> who could resolve Ukraine\u2019s continued recruitment crisis. This is arguably the area in which Fedorov failed to make<\/a> sufficient progress.<\/p>\n In light of sustained rumours about<\/a> a new mobilisation of Russian troops for the war in the autumn, it is clear that Ukraine\u2019s manpower problem is becoming more acute and needs an urgent resolution.<\/p>\n According to Fedorov\u2019s diagnosis<\/a> of the scale of the problem, 2 million Ukrainians are currently wanted for draft evasion, and 200,000 soldiers are absent without official leave.<\/p>\n Less clear, however, is why Klymenko was touted for the role. As interior minister, he was at least part of the problem<\/a> caused by so-called \u201cbusification\u201d<\/a> \u2013 the forcible seizure of military-age Ukrainian men by recruitment officials. Klymenko has consistently maintained<\/a> that these officials have acted within the boundaries of martial law.<\/p>\n Klymenko\u2019s refusal to accept the position may also have been an implicit acknowledgement of how difficult a job any reform of recruitment would be. This is particularly the case given Zelensky\u2019s highly public commitment<\/a> to eradicating busification, during his press conference with the outgoing British prime minister, Keir Starmer, in Kyiv on July 16.<\/p>\n Yevhenii Khmara, a major general and acting head of the Ukrainian intelligence service SBU, has now been appointed<\/a> as acting defence minister. Given Kharma\u2019s previous role in supporting<\/a> Ukraine\u2019s intensifying air campaign against Russia, his appointment placates critics of the Fedorov dismissal. These include members of Zelensky\u2019s own party<\/a>, who saw Klymenko as insufficiently aligned with Fedorov\u2019s strategy in the war.<\/p>\n But a realignment with Fedorov\u2019s vision of how to win the war will do little to address either the recruitment issue or the underlying conflict with Syrskyi. That this will likely fester could be particularly destabilising, because the timeline towards Kharma\u2019s parliamentary confirmation is unclear. <\/p>\n Under Ukrainian law<\/a>, Kharma first has to resign from active military service before he can take on the civilian role of defence minister. He then has to<\/a> be formally nominated by the president, after which the Ukrainian parliament must approve his appointment.<\/p>\nFedorov\u2019s replacement<\/h2>\n
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