The ceasefire in the Middle East is on shaky ground. Israel continued its bombardment of Lebanon on Wednesday, claiming its activities there are not part of the deal with Iran. These attacks killed at least 254 people across Lebanon and injured over 800 more in what was Israel’s largest offensive of the war so far.
Iran responded by closing the Strait of Hormuz again and threatened a “regret-inducing response” if the strikes continue. Donald Trump subsequently warned that US strikes on Iran would resume if it did not comply with the ceasefire. We spoke to Scott Lucas, an expert in Middle East politics at University College Dublin, who addresses several key issues.
Why is there confusion about whether Lebanon was included in the ceasefire?
Part of the problem is the nature of diplomacy in 2026. The Trump camp and Pakistan’s prime minister, Shahbaz Sharif, who has been a key mediator between the US and Iran since the start of the war, both issued statements on social media instead of coordinating the release of an agreed text.
That said, there should be no confusion. Sharif’s social media post made clear that the ceasefire also applies to Israel’s campaign in Lebanon. He wrote: “I am pleased to announce that the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America, along with their allies, have agreed to an immediate ceasefire everywhere including Lebanon and elsewhere, EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.”
Trump also accepted that later peace talks in Pakistan would be based on Iran’s ten-point plan, which he described as a “workable basis on which to negotiate”. One of Iran’s demands is for “an end to attacks on Iran and its allies”. This includes the Israeli strikes against Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Why then is Israel still attacking Lebanon?
Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, does not have an interest in ending the war until he establishes something he can claim as a “victory”. Israel’s objective in Iran is regime change. At the start of the war, Netanyahu announced that the “goal of the operation is to put an end to the threat from the Ayatollah regime in Iran”.
Trump’s goals in Iran are less clear. He entered the war pledging to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, destroy its missile capability, break its regional proxies, eliminate its navy and create an opening for regime change. But Iran’s regime is still in place and the Trump camp now appears willing to enter into negotiations with it.
So Netanyahu’s focus shifts to Lebanon and expansion of the Israeli occupation in the south of the country. Attacks will continue until that is achieved. The situation is similar to Gaza, where Israel now occupies 53% of the territory after its two years of attacks.
By presenting a victory over the threat of Hezbollah, pushing the group further from the Israeli border, Netanyahu can try to bolster his support at home despite any disappointment over the inconclusive outcome of the war in Iran.
Will Israel’s actions push the Gulf states closer to Iran?
For the first time since the start of the US and Israel’s war on February 28, the Iranian and Saudi Arabian foreign ministers have spoken by phone. In a statement following the call on April 9, the Saudi foreign ministry said the two men “reviewed the latest developments and discussed ways to reduce tensions to restore security and stability in the region”.
However, this is only a tentative beginning to repair the damage of the past six weeks. Gulf states are unhappy that the US exposed them to Iran’s retaliation by embarking upon the war, but that does not erase their anger with Tehran over the extent of the damage Iranian attacks have caused to energy infrastructure in the region.
Reports suggest that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have in recent weeks even been pressing the Trump camp to “finish the job” in Iran with ground operations to vanquish the regime. That option appears to have been paused for now. However, it is not off the table if the US-Iran negotiations collapse.
Where does all of this leave Donald Trump?
Angry, frustrated and uncertain what to do next. Trump’s bluster on April 7, in which he said “a whole civilization will die tonight” unless Iran reached a deal, was always an expression of weakness rather than strength. The plan A for regime surrender, with the killing of the Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei and dozens of commanders and officials, did not have a plan B for when the remaining leaders refused to concede and instead struck back.
With Iran controlling the Strait of Hormuz and choking off Gulf shipping, including of oil and gas, the Trump camp was reduced to either ground operations or talks. Trump snatched at the latter amid military advice of the difficulties of a ground assault and domestic opinion that is largely opposed to further escalation.
But he did so by handing Iran the diplomatic initiative. Now the White House is trying to pull it back, including by giving Israel the green light to continue its assault in Lebanon. The US is now denying that Lebanon was ever included in the ceasefire deal, with Trump calling it a “separate skirmish”.
The situation in the Middle East thus remains extremely volatile as delegates from the US and Iran head to the Pakistani capital of Islamabad for crunch talks on April 10.
Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.