Hungary’s long-serving leader, Viktor Orbán, was dismissed on April 12 by an electorate fed up with his authoritarian rule. Péter Magyar led his Tisza party to a landslide victory, securing a two-thirds majority in parliament. This is enough for Tisza to elect members of Hungary’s highest court and even amend the constitution.
Magyar has vowed to change the constitution as one of his first steps in office in a drive to restore democratic standards. Religious minority groups in Hungary, including several that have been treated harshly by Orbán, are likely to be among the main beneficiaries of this change.
Before Orbán came to power, the Hungarian constitution guaranteed the right to choose or change religion and the freedom to express such beliefs. However, Hungary’s religious landscape underwent significant change over Orbán’s 16 years in power.
In June 2011, not long after winning a landslide two-thirds majority in parliament, MPs from Orbán’s Fidesz party passed a law that reduced the number of recognised religious groups in Hungary from 44 to 14.
The main beneficiaries were a group of Christian churches: the Catholic Church, Reformed Church, Lutheran Church, Unitarian Church, Baptist Union and various Orthodox communities. These churches received special commendations as so-called “historical churches” that had played formative roles in Hungarian society.
The main losers from the new law included the Hungarian Evangelical Fellowship (MET), which is led by prominent anti-Orbán critic Gábor Iványi, as well as Buddhist groups and the Hungarian Islamic Community, the oldest Muslim group in the country.
The impetus for the 2011 law came from Orbán’s coalition partner, the Christian National Democratic Party, whose support largely came from the “historical churches” that benefited from the new law. The 14 groups singled out on the official recognition list received various tangible benefits. They were given access to public funding for social services, and people could donate a proportion of their income tax directly to these groups.
Hungary’s constitutional court rejected the new religion law in December 2011, primarily because the parliament approved the law through a highly irregular process. Parliament then drew up nearly identical legislation in response. After more back and forth, Orbán changed the constitution itself in 2013. This change gave parliament explicit and final authority to determine which religious groups to recognise.
Explicit political considerations were injected into the government’s procedure for recognising religious groups. Religious communities had to apply and show they would “cooperate with the state” by providing social services, such as running homeless shelters, schools and eldercare facilities.
These applications were assessed by the Hungarian parliament – and religious groups had to receive a two-thirds majority vote to receive official recognition.
The politicisation of religious life raised immediate objections. Several groups that had been “de-registered”, such as Iványi’s MET, complained of discrimination. They filed lawsuits that went all the way to the European Court of Human Rights.
In a 2014 decision, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Hungary’s religion law was in breach of multiple articles of the European Convention. This included Article 11, which protects the freedoms of religion and association. The judgment included an order to establish a new process for registering religious groups and a requirement to provide financial restitution to the complainants.
But in a statement released following the verdict, Hungary’s Ministry of Human Resources said the Hungarian government had no obligation to adhere to the court’s rulings. The court’s decision, the statement continued, was evidence of a conspiracy by unnamed “international interest groups”. The restrictive religious legal framework remained largely in place despite the ruling.
This confrontation was one of the first instances of the Orbán government coming into clear conflict with the EU. And the government’s antagonistic response set the tone for the next decade of rancour that has imposed serious damage on Hungary’s relationship with the EU.
Indeed, relations had sunk so low by 2026 that the Danish government called for the suspension of Hungary’s EU voting rights and EU legal experts began drawing up scenarios for recreating a new union without Hungary and Orbán.
Depoliticising religion
The damages for Hungarian religious groups affected by the law have been financial and spiritual. Some groups eventually received financial compensation. But others were forced to register with the government as secular “civil associations” in order to receive government funding. Some refused to change their registration for reasons of religious conscience and effectively ceased to operate entirely.
Now that Orbán’s reign is over, the focus should be on changing the constitution. First and foremost, the process for registering religious groups should be depoliticised. Parliament should have no role and instead the decisions should be turned over to an independent body of experts whose appointments are not dependent on parliament.
But action also needs to be taken by the leadership of Hungary’s Christian churches that enjoyed the privileges of official recognition throughout Orbán’s rule. In large part, these groups did not speak up on behalf of other religious groups as they suffered discrimination at the hands of an antagonistic state.
Magyar has promised to put a revised constitution up for a popular referendum. If the constitution does include substantial and clear provisions for the depoliticisation of religion governance, the church institutions that benefited from Orbán’s rule should use their public moral authority to encourage Hungarians to vote yes.
This would go a long way to demonstrating a commitment to equal treatment for all of Hungary’s religious groups.
Marc Roscoe Loustau does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.