The 60-day ceasefire signed by the US and Iran three weeks ago fell apart on July 8. Iran targeted vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz without its say-so, prompting the US to respond with strikes against a range of military targets in the Islamic Republic.
President Donald Trump declared the ceasefire “over”, saying further talks would be a “waste of time”, and the two sides have subsequently exchanged further rounds of attacks. We asked Scott Lucas, an expert in Middle East and US politics at the Clinton Institute, University College Dublin, to explain why the conflict appears to have restarted and what might happen next.
Why has Iran started this conflict up again – wasn’t the 14-point deal generally thought of as a victory for them?
The clashes arise from the quest for control of the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway through which around 20% of the world’s maritime oil and gas passes. Iran established that control days after the war began. The Trump camp needs to break it; otherwise, they will have to negotiate a deal based largely on Iranian terms.
Several rounds of clashes have taken place since the initial ceasefire was declared in April. Iran attacks a few vessels trying to cross the strait without Tehran’s permission, preventing the US from establishing a shipping corridor off the Omani coast that is outside Iranian control. The US military responds with strikes on Iranian military sites around its southern coast. After a few days, each side pulls back.
However, there is one twist in the latest cycle. The US hit not only military targets but also two civilian bridges connecting the Iranian capital, Tehran, to the second city, Mashhad.
I think that may have been symbolic rather than a substantive escalation – the assassinated Iranian supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, was being buried in Mashhad on Thursday. However, this is worth watching, in case the Trump camp are thinking of renewing strikes on civilian infrastructure.
What role are the Gulf states playing and how are they aligning?
Iran’s retaliation reinforces the message the regime sent after it survived the initial US-Israeli strikes – that it has the will and capacity to survive what is thrown at it, and cause chaos in the region.
In June 2025, during Israel’s 12-day war, Tehran refrained from striking the Gulf states. This time, it made clear the gloves were off, with serious damage and effects on the political and economic positions of the six Gulf countries.
That set off a chain of consequences, including a split among those countries. The United Arab Emirates is moving closer to Israel and the Trump camp. Saudi Arabia was angered about the lack of US protection early in the war, but wanted Trump to “finish the job” with ground troops forcing the capitulation of the Iranian regime.
Once that did not happen, the Saudis switched to playing both sides – they are the power behind Pakistan’s mediation while continuing to encourage US action, which could weaken the regime.
Qatar has established itself as a mediator alongside – and possibly beyond – Pakistan. Oman is now manoeuvring between trying to work with Iran and trying to comply with Trump’s demands over the strait. Bahrain always follows the Saudi lead and Kuwait just wants the conflict to end.
Is there any prospect of the US strikes crippling Iran militarily?
Throughout the war, US-Israeli strikes have killed Iranian political and military leaders. They have blasted military sites, obliterated the Iranian navy, and disabled missile launchers and drone production facilities.
But much of Iran’s power lies in mobile capability, from drones and missiles to the small boats and mines of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
US intelligence estimated in May that Iran still possessed around 70% of its pre-war stock of missiles and 70% of its missile launchers. According to the same assessments, only three Iranian missile sites along the strait were inaccessible.
Not only has all this been sufficient for Iran to control the Strait of Hormuz, it has enabled Iran to maintain its ability to retaliate against Israel and the Gulf states. And the Trump camp – which may have tried to seize stocks of enriched uranium this spring – has now learned that this task may be impossible.
Who is more resilient right now: Iran under renewed sanctions, or the Trump administration facing elections in four months?
The Iranian regime is in a stronger political position than it was before the war. Its economy was in serious trouble then, sparking January’s public protests, and it will be in serious economic trouble again unless there is a protracted ceasefire and the chance to rebuild.
Despite the potential lifting of sanctions and unfreezing of assets, it faces costs of more than $270 billion (£201 billion) in war-related damage, much of it to essential infrastructure.
But for now, it can rely on the priority of its show of defiance. The Strait of Hormuz, which had offered free passage for all vessels up to February 28, is now in the hands of the Iranians. That has made global economic shocks more significant than Tehran’s difficulties.
Before the war, Iran was ready to accept limits on its uranium enrichment and a renewal of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspections, disrupted by the 2025 war. Now, this issue has been relegated behind a resolution of the strait.
Unless the US military can force open the waterway, any resolution will see Iran getting benefits that were not assured before February 28. These include the lifting of some US sanctions, the unfreezing of some Iranian assets, and possibly a private investment and reconstruction fund of up to US$300 billion.
There is no upside for the Trump camp now. It has failed to get regime surrender. It has handed the initiative to its foe. Its military strength has been superseded by political ineptitude and failure. It is fighting a war which is widely disliked at home – even more so because of the self-inflicted economic pain for Americans.
Having sought a display of dominance abroad, the Trump camp now has to wear the badge of loss. With midterm elections fast approaching in the US, this could be costly.
Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.